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I. Introduction
Consider Ethel Baxter, an elderly woman who has never
missed so much as a car payment in her decades of credit history.
Her claims record is essentially spotless—a dream policyholder for
insurers. She lives in northern California, owns her own home, and
has regular income from social security and a part-time job. Now
imagine the conversation when her insurance provider tells Ethel
that she is no longer eligible for property insurance because her
home is located near wild brush that represents a fire hazard.
Ethel has never heard of the brush impacting her policy before, nor
did she have any meeting or conversation with a claims adjuster
about it at any point. How could this have happened to such an
outstanding policyholder like herself? Why didn’t she have an
opportunity to be heard, or at least understand the process? How
did the insurance company decide her property was suddenly too
high of a risk?
What if the decision wasn’t even made by a real person?
Ethel’s insurer has just received an exemption to fly drones over
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insured properties for “risk assessment” and property surveillance.
What if Ethel was evaluated by something without the ability to
see beyond still-shots, numbers, and analytical formulas;
something programmed to analyze and predict the future of her
property without so much as a blink in her direction?
This is the danger that people like Ethel face with the rise of
commercial insurance drones in risk assessment and claims
adjustment. 1 Insurance companies are at the forefront of a
movement by commercial entities to take advantage of evolving
drone technology. 2 These insurers envision a world where drones
will replace human agents in field operations across the industry,
gathering, analyzing, and sharing data with a ruthless efficiency
that the public has never seen. 3 In this world, human agents will
be necessary only to rubber-stamp the recommendations of a
drone’s analysis of a property. 4 Proponents of drone integration
laud their potential to offer crucial assistance in claims and
assessment situations where a human agent would encounter
danger and difficulty. 5 Lost in the revelry, however, is an equally
dangerous issue: will these drones increase the likelihood of
unfairly discriminatory insurance practices, and can that effect be
stopped?

1. See Donan, infra note 106 (“UAVs eventually will enjoy widespread
adoption throughout [the insurance] industry, and one day in the foreseeable
future they will be commonplace.”).
2. See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (giving an estimate of
operational commercial drones expected by 2020, and discussing the role of
insurance companies in the integration process).
3. See Keven Moore, Drones May Be Coming To a Fender-Bender or a Storm
Near You, KYFORWARD (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.kyforward.com/keven-mooreon-insurance-drones-may-be-coming-to-a-fender-bender-or-storm-near-you/ (last
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“In the future, underwriters can send out drones to assess
square footage of the building, the condition of a building’s exterior as they can
provide great views of roofing, siding, windows, perimeter fencing, lighting
exterior hazards, neighboring exposures in great detail.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See id. (describing the various uses for insurance drones in claims
adjustment and underwriting, and envisioning a system where insurance agents
rely on the data drones gather to process a claim off-site).
5. See id. (praising the versatility of drones and their potential to replace
insurance agents in common, hazardous situations presented by the industry,
such as roof damage assessment, fire and disaster assessment, and catastrophe
surveys).
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This potential for unfairly discriminatory insurance practices
also implicates constitutional issues—namely, a potential clash
with the Disparate Impact Rule. 6 The concept of disparate impact
reflects the federal government’s concern for the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and facially discriminatory
practices. 7 The operation of the Rule legitimizes an Equal
Protection claim for “protected classes” who experience a
discriminatory impact from an insurance practice that is
technically legal. 8 Although its application has been met with some
resistance, Congress has specifically recognized the Rule’s
importance in prohibiting discriminatory insurance practices in
the housing market. 9 The integration of risk assessment drones,
however, threatens to reanimate these issues with a vengeance. 10
If insurers’ usage of drones is not appropriately regulated, the
potential for conceptually legal insurance practices with disparate,
discriminatory consequences becomes an unchecked reality. 11
What do we tell Ethel as she fights for a fair insurance rating
against an enemy who doesn’t talk back? How will we assure those
who land in a risk assessment drone’s sights that they are being
fairly evaluated, and that the data these drones are collecting is
being properly used and protected? Can we even promise those
protections? The reality of what the public faces here is
6. Discriminatory Effect Prohibited, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2015).
7. See infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text (outlining the concept of
disparate impact and its development through Supreme Court jurisprudence as
a response to Equal Protection concerns in discrimination claims).
8. See § 100.500 (“Liability may be established under the Fair Housing Act
based on a practice's discriminatory effect . . . even if the practice was not
motivated by a discriminatory intent.”).
9. See infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (discussing the
codification, statutory structure, and requirements of the modern version of the
Disparate Impact Rule as applied in concert with the Fair Housing Act).
10. See Tom Karol, Unmanned Aerial Systems/Drones—Regulation,
Liability, and Insurance Requirements, NAT’L ASS’N MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES 6–7
(2015), http://www.namic.org/pdf/15memberadvisory/150226_drones.pdf (listing
insurers’ intended uses for commercial drones in the risk assessment and claims
adjustment fields, discussing potential liabilities from data collection and
scanning, and large-scale impacts on subjects of drone operations).
11. See id. at 14 (warning of the “lack of regulatory specification” with regard
to insurers’ evolving usage of commercial drones, and suggesting that insurers
themselves must “play a role in developing standards of good practice” for such
drone operations if they are to avoid liability and damaging impacts to the public).
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inescapable. Discriminatory insurance practices like redlining
have once again become tangible threats because of this robotic
and impersonal risk assessment and claims adjustment process. 12
If the regulatory landscape does not adapt to these new dangers
with deliberate speed, any hope for a clear, consistent, or even
adequate response to this threat is left in shambles. 13
Part II of this Note outlines the development of both unfair
discrimination and disparate impact jurisprudence within the
insurance industry and where it stands today. 14 Part III offers a
primer on the integration of commercial drones into the insurance
industry and their capabilities, followed by a brief introduction to
the current regulatory landscape surrounding commercial drone
usage. 15 Subsequently, Part IV discusses the nexus between risk
assessment and claims adjustment drones and a potential rise in
discriminatory insurance practices. 16 Finally, Part V exposes the
inadequacies of current regulatory efforts towards these drones
and discusses how best to identify and respond to potential
discriminatory practices. 17 Part V also proposes targeted solutions
for identified risks in the form of a cohesive regulatory scheme, and
ultimately explores which entities, if any, could best implement
such a proposal. 18

12. See infra notes 130–140 and accompanying text (examining modern
insurance tactics that utilize evolving technology to revive discriminatory
redlining and other discriminatory insurance practices).
13. See Karol, supra note 10, at 14 (“There will always be risks in the
commercial use of drones, and property/ casualty insurance will be a critical
consideration . . . but responsible insurance coverage for this emerging area will
require more development of federal, state, and local regulations . . . .”).
14. Infra Part II.
15. Infra Part III.
16. Infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.A–B (discussing the inadequacies of present commercial
drone regulations and proposing a methodology for identifying potential risks and
developing regulatory countermeasures to respond to them).
18. See infra Part V.C (proposing targeted regulatory countermeasures to
combat unfairly discriminatory insurance practices resulting from commercial
drone integration, and exploring suitable entities for implementation of those
solutions).
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II. Development of Current Unfair Discrimination and Disparate
Impact Jurisprudence
A. Unfairly Discriminatory Insurance Practices
Understanding unfairly discriminatory insurance practices
and the development of the law behind them is critical in
exploring the correlation between these practices and risk
assessment drones. Assessing and rating the risks inherent to a
potential subject of insurance is a central element of an insurer’s
formula. 19 Consequently, the need for guidance on the
appropriate methods for this assessment cannot be
understated. 20
“The standard rating law holds that rates shall not be
‘excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.’” 21 “Unfair
discrimination, as the term is employed by the Insurance Code,
means discrimination among insureds of the same class based
upon something other than actuarial risk.” 22 Facially, the law
seems to provide a relatively straightforward starting point for
evaluating discriminatory insurance practices. 23 Practically, this
is merely a cliff from which most analyses plunge into chaos. In
particular, two aspects of this mystifying jurisprudence are of
interest to this Note: the multitude of subjective tests that courts

19. See Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance AntiDiscrimination Laws 1 (Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 52, 2013),
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=law_e
con_current (“Insurers attempt to segregate insureds into separate risk pools
based on their differences in risk profiles, first, so that they can charge different
premiums to the different groups based on their risk and, second, to incentivize
risk reduction by insureds.”).
20. See id. at 2 (stating that, despite the “valuable social function” that
insurers can provide through discrimination, there are “limits on the
discrimination that insurers are permitted to engage in”).
21. 2 NATHANIEL S. SHAPO, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY
EDITION § 11.03(1)(a) (2013). For examples of statutes that reflect the “excessive,
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory” standard, see generally COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 10-4-401(1) (2015); D.C. CODE § 31-2703(A) (2015).
22. SHAPO, supra note 21 § 11.03.
23. See id. (“The laws pertaining to risk discrimination are evaluated under
terms of art: fair discrimination and unfair discrimination. It is well established
that the dividing line is determined by actuarial justification.”).
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use for determining whether discrimination is “unfair” 24 and the
rise—and possible fall—of the Disparate Impact Rule. 25
Some discrimination in insurance practices is acceptable—if
not unavoidable—due to the nature of weighing risk against
coverage, but there must be a limit. 26 State courts have struggled,
however, with various subjective patterns of analysis for
determining whether a particular insurance practice is “unfairly”
discriminatory. 27 State statutes are often the primary guidance for
courts in this evaluation, yet this guidance has led to even greater
inconsistency. 28
In Hartford Accounting and Indemnification Co. v. Insurance
Commissioner of the Commonwealth, 29 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that it was within its power to enforce the state
legislature’s prohibition on “unfairly discriminatory” insurance
ratings. 30 Yet, the court acknowledged that the relevant statute
did not define the phrase and, thus, took the responsibility of
defining it in the context of the facts before it. 31 Ultimately, the
court rejected a narrow, technical interpretation of “fairness” 32 and
24. See infra notes 27–43 and accompanying text (comparing subjective state
court analyses of “fairness” and describing the inconsistencies in state antidiscrimination law).
25. See infra notes 45–63 and accompanying text (detailing the genesis,
evolution, and application of the Disparate Impact Rule).
26. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 2 (“Insurers attempt to classify insureds
into separate risk pools based on differences in their risk profiles. Thus, insurers
openly discriminate among individuals based on observable characteristics.”).
27. See id. at 1 (offering an overview of the Article’s discussion, including the
lack of federal regulation and the reliance on various state schemes for evaluating
discriminatory practices in the insurance field).
28. See id. at 3 (“[D]iscrimination by insurers in the underwriting process is
largely unregulated at the federal level, leaving the states as the regulators of
insurer discrimination.”).
29. 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984).
30. See id. at 546 (“[T]he legislature has directly prohibited insurers from
making ‘unfairly discriminatory’ rates, and has entrusted enforcement of that
prohibition . . . to the courts.”).
31. See id. (“The basic issue in this appeal is the proper interpretation of the
phrase ‘unfairly discriminatory’ as employed in section 3(d) of the Rate Act, 40
P.S. § 1183(d) (1971). That phrase is not defined in the Rate Act itself.”).
32. See id. at 547 (“[S]ection 3(d) manifests separate legislative objectives
which represent the recognition that a rate may be justified by the actuarial data
offered in its support, yet unfair in its underlying assumptions and its application
to the individual.”).
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instead held that fairness represented a legislative concept beyond
what was required for a mere actuarial justification. 33 This
prompted “public policy considerations,” including an examination
of legislative intent behind provisions of Pennsylvania’s
constitution and consideration of subjective factors such as “social
acceptability.” 34 Ultimately, the court stopped short of ruling solely
on public policy. Instead, the court linked a broader definition of
“unfair discrimination” to the state’s constitution. 35 Despite the
court’s ruling, however, it cannot be denied that subjective factors
colored the Hartford court’s interpretation of the relevant
statutory direction through the consideration of the state’s
“established public policy.” 36
Compare the Hartford ruling to the Oregon Court of Appeals
decision in Lemma Wine Co. v. National Council on Compensation
Insurance. 37 In Lemma, the court took a narrower route to
determine the meaning of “unfairly discriminatory” thanks to
Oregon’s more specific statutory language. 38 Where the
33. See id. (“[T]he ‘fairness’ of rates must be recognized as a legislative
concern distinct from and transcending the need for sound actuarial
justification.”).
34. See id. at 547–49 (discussing various public policies relating to equal
protection and discrimination, holding that public policy considerations “require
more adequate justification for rating factors than simple statistical correlation
with loss,” and recommending the consideration of criteria such as causality,
reliability, and social acceptability in judging the “reasonableness of a
classification system”).
35. The court read gender-based discrimination as “unfair” based on its
interpretation of the state legislature’s intent in drafting the document. See id. at
549 (ruling that, while the court did not affirmatively recognize the power of the
state commissioner to “implement the public policy of [Pennsylvania] in the
absence of legislative direction,” considerations of the legislature’s intent and
relevant social and political factors necessitated a broad definition of “unfair”
discrimination).
36. See id. at 549 (upholding the Commissioner’s ruling that the rating
classification’s sex-based discrimination was “contrary to established public
policy” and was an appropriate exercise of his power in determining the fairness
of a discriminatory insurance practice).
37. See 95 P.3d 238, 240 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (evaluating an allegedly unfair
discrimination in rating assessment in the application of a worker’s compensation
ratings exception to various employees, and stating that the question presented
was “whether some of employer's workers should be subject to a standard
exception”).
38. See id. at 243 (citing OAR 836–042–0025(3), which provides that
“[p]remiums are unfairly discriminatory if differentials between insureds fail to
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Pennsylvania court refuted a technical definition of fairness, the
Lemma court embraced it, focusing on statistical differentials and
whether they were reasonably reflected in ratings. 39 Even so, the
Oregon statute’s reliance on a “reasonable reflection” standard still
leaves courts holding the bag by placing yet another subjective
evaluation on their shoulders. 40
The Hartford and Lemma holdings are just two examples of
the inherent difficulties states face in evaluating “unfair
discrimination.” States are forced to accept this burden in large
part due to the dearth of applicable federal laws. 41 This in turn has
led to the large and inconsistent existing pool of state risk
classification laws. 42 For example, eighteen states currently have
no restrictions against the consideration of race in property and
casualty insurance risk classification. 43 The inconsistency in these
statutes with regard to both the characteristics they consider and
the jurisdictions in which they reside set a dangerous stage for the
courts that rely on them. 44

reasonably reflect the differences in expected losses and expenses to the insurer
attributable to the insureds” (emphasis added)).
39. See id. (describing OAR 836–042–0025(3)’s exceptions to an unfair
discrimination classification where statistical differences used in the rating
scheme can be “attributed to the insureds” and those differences are “reasonably
reflected” by the rating plan or system at issue).
40. See id. (balancing the ultimate decision of whether to apply a statutory
exception on whether or not “reasonableness” could be shown and failing to define
“reasonableness” in the context of the statute).
41. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 3 (discussing that, outside of four recent
federal statutes, “there are no federal laws expressly forbidding insurers from
engaging in any form of discrimination in the underwriting process”).
42. See id. at 4–5 (discussing the “conventional wisdom” among insurance
scholars (scholars encompasses teachers) in describing characteristics which were
assumed to be prohibited from consideration in risk classification by all states,
and discrediting those assumptions through contrary statistical evidence).
43. See id. at 5 (listing the number of states that do not restrict the
consideration of race as a risk classification factor for different insurance sectors
such as health, life, automobile, and property insurance). “As all this suggests,
affirmative bans of insurer discrimination on the basis of potentially suspect
policyholder traits are quite rare.” Id.
44. See id. at 46 (“[T]he precise rules that govern the line between
permissible and impermissible discrimination [have] been almost entirely
ignored, in large part because of the complexity and opacity of state law on the
topic.”).
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B. The Disparate Impact Rule

One of the rare federal regimes to address discriminatory
insurance practices specifically is the Disparate Impact Rule (the
Rule). 45 The Rule represents the federal government’s desire to
create a consistent standard for applying the Fair Housing Act
(FHA) to discrimination claims brought against facially neutral
practices. 46 It allows a plaintiff struggling or unable to prove the
existence of discriminatory intent to earn a favorable judgment
nonetheless. 47
The Rule’s conception traces back to seminal Supreme Court
equal protection decisions, including Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 48 and Washington v.
Davis. 49 In both cases, the Court eventually rejected the Rule (then
referred to as “disproportionate impact”) as standalone grounds to
prove a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause. 50 The Court laid the groundwork for the Rule’s evolution,
however, in its discussion of claims under Title VII of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, 51 arguing that the consideration of such an impact,
45. See Michael J. Miller, Disparate Impact and Unfairly Discriminatory
Insurance Rates, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y E-FORUM 276, 281 (2009),
http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/09wforum/miller.pdf (summarizing courts’
definitions of disparate impact discrimination and subjective methods of analysis
used to define what disparate impact practices may be considered fairly or
unfairly discriminatory).
46. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11, 460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (“This rule serves the need
described above by establishing a consistent standard for assessing claims that a
facially neutral practice violates the Fair Housing Act and by incorporating that
standard in HUD’s existing Fair Housing Act regulations at 24 CFR 100.500.”).
47. See Discriminatory Effect Prohibited, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2015)
(“Liability may be established under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice's
discriminatory effect, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, even if the
practice was not motivated by a discriminatory intent.”).
48. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
49. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
50. See Village, 429 U.S. at 264–65 (“[O]fficial action will not be held
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.”);
Davis, 426 U.S. at 238–39 (asserting that the Court has never held the
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of racial discrimination to be
focused solely on a “racially differential impact” and declining to do so in the case
at issue).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
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although not controlling, was “not irrelevant.” 52 This treatment of
disproportionate impact, despite the outcomes of Village and
Davis, legitimized the concept as a potential tool in discriminationbased claims.
In 2013, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) issued a notice of final rulemaking allowing
the Rule’s application to insurance practices through the FHA. 53
The Code of Federal Regulations 54 defines discriminatory effects
sufficient to trigger the Rule, 55 describes the burdens required for
its application, 56 and offers defendants a chance to preempt its
application through justification. 57
The basic purpose of the Rule’s application to insurance is to
prohibit insurance practices related to housing that “have an
unjustified disparate impact on protected classes.” 58 For example,
in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cisneros, 59 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a practical application of
the Rule to a disfavored insurance practice known as “redlining.” 60
52. See Village, 429 U.S. at 265 (citing Davis in a discussion of
disproportionate impact as “not irrelevant” but also not controlling in a finding of
invidious racial discrimination); Davis, 426 U.S. at 242, 246–47 (holding that
“disproportionate impact is not irrelevant [to find invidious racial
discrimination],” and discussing Title VII’s more stringent standard for
“validation” of challenged practices with racially disproportionate impacts while
conceding the benefits of its application in certain situations outside of the
holding at issue).
53. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,460 (showing the notice of final rulemaking that
described the discriminatory effects provision’s enactment through the FHA and
applying it to insurance practices).
54. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2015).
55. See id. (including predictable disparate impacts and patterns of
segregated housing based on “race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status,
or national origin”).
56. See id. (requiring a plaintiff to establish that the challenged practice has
caused or will predictably cause a discriminatory effect as defined in the section).
57. See id. (offering defendants a chance to rebut a claimant’s challenge by
proving that the challenged practice is “necessary to achieve one or more
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests” of the defendant).
58. Avraham, supra note 19, at 3.
59. 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995).
60. See id. at 1354–59 (holding that the government supports HUD’s
interpretation of the FHA, which includes a prohibition against “redlining,” and
considering it an unfairly discriminatory practice).
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The Cisneros court defined “redlining” as any situation where “the
insurer charges higher rates or declines to write insurance for
people who live in particular areas.” 61 A two-to-one decision
granted deference to the state’s interpretation of the Rule and
deemed redlining an unfairly discriminatory practice under the
FHA’s construction in the context of property and hazard
insurance. 62 Other courts have similarly applied the Rule to racial
and economic discrimination scenarios involving risk
assessment. 63
Such applications of the Rule, however, came under recent
scrutiny by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in
American Insurance Association v. United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development. 64 The court found that the
FHA’s prohibition is clearly limited to cases of “intentional”
discrimination. 65 Consequently, the FHA preempts any disparate
impact claims because they necessarily involve a lack of
discriminatory intent. 66 Still, other courts have declined to follow
the American Insurance court’s reasoning and continue to consider
the Rule as a legitimate means of finding an insurance practice
unfairly discriminatory in certain contexts. 67
Amidst this disagreement, the Rule won a critical victory in
the Supreme Court. In Texas Department of Housing &
61. Id. at 1359.
62. See id. (“[W]e conclude that HUD’s interpretation of the Fair Housing
Act is reasonable in light of the direct connection of availability of property
insurance and ability to purchase a house.”).
63. See Miller, supra note 45, at 282 (describing various courts’ application
of the disparate impact discrimination concept to insurance practices, including
racial and economic discrimination scenarios as compared to “risk
discrimination”).
64. See 74 F. Supp. 3d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing the operation of the
disparate impact rule and the “clear language” jurisprudence surrounding its
application to claims of discriminatory intent or effect).
65. See id. at 39 (“For the following reasons, I agree with the plaintiffs that
the FHA unambiguously prohibits only intentional discrimination.”).
66. See id. (holding that because the FHA “unambiguously prohibits only
intentional discrimination” the Disparate Impact Rule is outside the scope of the
APA for this matter).
67. See Viens v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 113 F. Supp. 3d 555, 572
(D. Conn. 2015) (declining to follow American Insurance in holding that disparate
impact claims were not preempted by the FHA and did not conflict with the
McCann-Ferguson Act).
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Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 68 the
Supreme Court responded to the growing debate over the Rule’s
role in the FHA. Inclusive Communities upheld the FHA’s
application of the Rule to equal protection claims regarding
housing discrimination. 69 The Court praised the Rule’s ability to
sniff out discriminatory intent 70 and promote the objectives of the
FHA. 71 Furthermore, the Court stressed that the limitations and
built-in safeguards within the Rule would prevent it from being
heavily abused. 72 Among other industries, insurers were
disappointed at the result of Inclusive Communities, as it
represents yet another volley in the increasingly unpredictable
enforcement of the Rule. 73
Given the inherent subjectivity of judicial evaluations of
“fairness,” 74 the incongruent landscape of relevant state laws, 75
68. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
69. See id. at 2525 (“The Court holds that disparate-impact claims are
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act upon considering its results-oriented
language, the Court’s interpretation of similar language in Title VII and the
ADEA, Congress’ ratification of disparate-impact claims in 1988 . . . and the
statutory purpose.”).
70. See id. at 2522 (“[The Rule] permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious
prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate
treatment.”).
71. See id. (“The availability of disparate-impact liability, furthermore, has
allowed private developers to vindicate the FHA’s objectives and to protect their
property rights by stopping municipalities from enforcing arbitrary and, in
practice, discriminatory ordinances barring the construction of certain types
of housing units.”).
72. See id. at 2522–25 (explaining the requirements for a claim to be brought
under the Rule for the purposes of the FHA and the guaranteed opportunity for a
defendant to explain a challenged practice, and offering some guidance for lower
courts in interpreting whether the claim meets the necessary statutory elements).
73. See Greg Stohr, Insurers Disappointed as Supreme Court Backs
Disparate Impact Claims, INS. J. (June 25, 2015), http://www.
insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015/06/25/373004.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2016) (detailing the responses of several major insurance lobbyist groups to the
Inclusive Communities holding, including the promise of the National Association
of Mutual Insurance Companies to “continue to fight [HUD’s] attempt to impose
[the Rule] without justification on the homeowners’ insurance marketplace”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. See supra notes 28–40 and accompanying text (discussing the subjective
analyses courts use in determining fairness in discriminatory practices).
75. See supra notes 41–44 (discussing the reliance of courts on state antidiscrimination laws, and the substantive differences and lack of predictability
with which they are constructed).
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and the precarious state of disparate impact jurisprudence, 76
insured parties may encounter increasing difficulty in challenging
insurance practices as unfair where clear discriminatory intent
cannot be shown. This trend poses an even graver threat to insured
parties when coupled with insurers’ unchecked implementation of
commercial risk assessment drones, whose capabilities represent
the next generation of potentially unfair discriminatory practices.
III. Risk Assessment Drones: Introduction, Capabilities, and
Current Regulations
A. Insurance Drones: Integration and Capabilities
This Note now applies the above understanding of antidiscrimination and disparate impact jurisprudence 77 to the
imminent rise of commercial risk assessment drones. By 2020, it is
estimated that “30,000 commercial drones will occupy the national
airspace.” 78 Currently, four major insurance providers have
received preliminary “test” exemptions allowing them to use
commercial drones for business purposes such as risk assessment
and claims adjustment. 79 In total, eleven “insurance companies”
have received such exemptions as of this writing. 80 The insurers’
76. See supra notes 64–74 and accompanying text (describing recent
challenges to the FHA’s application of the Rule and contention over whether to
apply it in enforcing discrimination violations found against facially neutral
practices with discriminatory effects).
77. See supra Part II (outlining the current state of fairness evaluations,
state anti-discrimination laws as applied to insurance practices, and disparate
impact jurisprudence).
78. See The Future of Drones in America: Law Enforcement and Privacy
Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 28
(2013) (Statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary)
(estimating the figures for drone integration in the next few years, and discussing
the government’s increasing role in preparing for that integration).
79. See Michael Thrasher, Insurance Companies Ready to Use Drones to
(Apr.
23,
2015,
6:00
PM),
Evaluate
Claims,
VENTUREBEAT
http://venturebeat.com/2015/04/23/insurance-companies-ready-to-use-drones-toevaluate-claims/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“[In addition to USAA,] State Farm,
AIG, and Erie Insurance have also been granted exemptions allowing for the
testing or use of drones commercially . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
80. See Authorizations Granted Via Section 333 Exemptions, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN.,

RATE ME: RISK ASSESSMENT DRONES

1563

justifications for drone implementation include the desires to
reduce the number of “feet on the ground” and streamline their
claims processes. 81
It is important to examine the capabilities of these drones to
understand the nexus between this technological revolution and
the potential for increased discriminatory insurance practices. The
latest risk assessment drones can collect images, video, and
statistical data at high speeds while flying programmed routes. 82
Many of these drones can also transmit collected data directly to
third parties such as defense attorneys and forensic engineers. 83
The immediate benefits of drone capabilities are concededly
appealing, especially considering the scale of properties that
insurers must often assess. 84 Researchers laud the preciseness and
versatility of the high-resolution cameras and laser scanners on
board in creating 3D maps of surveyed areas. 85 The potential for
http://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/333_authorizations/ (last
updated Sept. 20, 2016) (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (showing eleven total entries
for exemptions granted to “insurance companies” as defined in the FAA’s
database) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
81. See Thrasher, supra note 79 (describing USAA’s desire to implement
drones in claims assessment “so that there aren’t as many feet on the ground” and
discussing potential data transfer and communication capabilities of drones that
could streamline the flow of information).
82. See Agil Francis et al., Drones: The Insurance Industry’s Next GameCHALLENGING
4
(2009),
Changer?,
KEEP
http://www.cognizant.com/InsightsWhitepapers/drones-the-insuranceindustry's-next-game-changer-codex1019.pdf (describing the capabilities of risk
assessment drones’ on-board infrared cameras, high-resolution cameras,
navigation, and data transmission capabilities and claiming that this technology
forecloses the need for a human to conduct the investigation in person); see also
Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to
Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2014) (discussing
camera optics, sensors, and other equipment on various models of commercial and
military drones).
83. See White Paper Predicts Drones as Next Big Thing in Insurance, CLAIMS
J., http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2014/10/23/256681.htm (last
updated Oct. 23, 2014) (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“Utilizing outside experts
becomes easier since drones could transmit photos to defense attorneys, forensic
engineers and inside claims staff.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
84. See id. (discussing the ability of risk assessment drone models to reach
places, capture images, and scan large areas in ways that human agents cannot).
85. See MEASURE, INC., DRONES FOR DISASTER RESPONSE AND RELIEF
OPERATIONS 30 (2015) (describing the capability of drones to use LiDAR lasers
and high-definition cameras to map disaster areas, identify flooding patterns, and
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instant upload and third-party data transmissions through
software integration is also an emphasis point for drone
proponents searching for more efficient insurance practices. 86
Additionally, drone payloads are extremely customizable, allowing
insurers to outfit a model with anything and everything that might
aid the drone’s mission. 87 Some have even promoted the idea that
insurance drone technology might revolutionize disaster relief and
claims processing. 88 It is easy to see why groups champion the
introduction of this powerful technology into our airspace—it takes
a more critical perspective, however, to realize the risks.
B. Drone Regulations Today
Current government regulations on the use of commercial
drones are rudimentary at best, and their future remains vague.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was tasked with
promulgating initial rules to govern the integration of commercial
drones into the national airspace no later than September 30,
2015. 89 However, the FAA fell well behind the deadline initially set
for their first set of rules, 90 eating up months of valuable time
assess insurance claims and risks).
86. See id. at 7 (discussing commercial drone software pairing that allows
for things like data-sharing over a cloud-based network, crowd-sourced crisis
mapping, and integration with GPS and satellite networks).
87. See id. (discussing how a drone’s payload affects the types of data it can
collect, ranging from infrared and electro-optic sensors to communications relays
that broadcast wireless frequencies as a mobile hotspot).
88. See id. at 4 (“Drones naturally complement traditional manned relief
operations by helping to ensure that operations can be conducted safer, faster,
and more efficiently.”).
89. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-381, at 64 (2012) (Conf. Rep.) (ordering the FAA
to promulgate regulations for the integration of drones into the national airspace
no later than September 30, 2015). See generally Federal Aviation Administration
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (2012)
(offering a full text of the Act that mandates the FAA to provide for commercial
drone integration).
90. See Dibya Sarkar, NTIA to Address Drone Privacy, Transparency,
Accountability Early Next Month, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DAILY (July 21,
2015), http://criticalinfrastructuredaily.com/ntia-to-address-drone-privacy-trans
parency-accountability-early-next-month/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“The FAA is
also working on a congressional mandate to safely integrate unmanned aircraft
into the national airspace by September, but several officials have previously said
that deadline will likely not be met.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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reviewing and addressing comments to its proposed regulations
issued in February 2015. 91 In the meantime, the FAA issued a
special exemption application process for all “civil” (commercial)
unmanned aircraft systems. 92 A “Certificate of Authorization”
(COA) is also required but is generally granted as a “blanket”
certificate to most applicants. 93 The temporary requirements were
broad, cursory regulations aimed mostly at limiting the physical
operation. 94 Section 333 restrictions did not specifically evaluate
the technological capabilities of exempted drones. 95 Instead, they
merely required an applicant to describe the basics of the proposed
operation and how the exemption would benefit the public
interest. 96
In a disappointing—and overdue—finale, the FAA announced
its pending release of Final Rule 107 for small-scale drone
Review).
91. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
80 Fed. Reg. 9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 21)
(issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking and asking for public comment on the
integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace).
92. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95,
§ 333 (2012) (granting the exclusive authority for approval of interim usage of
civil unmanned aircraft in the national airspace to the Secretary of the FAA, and
mandating the creation of “safe operation” requirements for each unmanned
system to receive an exception).
93. See Petitioning for Exemption Under Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
http://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/how_to_file_a_petition/
(last updated Sept. 20, 2016, 8:09 PM) (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (explaining that
COA applications are separate from Section 333 applications, but that a “blanket”
COA will be issued to any unmanned air system with a Section 333 exception that
is under fifty-five pounds, flies under 200 feet, and is operated during the daytime
within visual line of sight of the operator) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
94. See id. (creating effectively applicable minimum safety regulations to
every Section 333 exemption, which are entirely aimed at controlling visual line
of sight, spacing and maximum altitude of flight, and size of the drone, without
regard to technical capability).
95. See Section 333 Petition Guidance and Checklist, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
http://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/how_to_file_a_petition/m
edia/How_to_Send_Your_Petition_for_Exemption_or_Rulemaking.pdf
(displaying a checklist containing “all the necessary information” for a complete
Section 333 petition, including operator name and address, regulations from
which relief is sought, safe operation and benefit the public interest justifications,
proposed operations, and the “make and model” of the aircraft, not including
operational manuals) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
96. See id. (describing the requirements of the checklist).
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operators, which is aimed at “opening pathways towards fully
integrating UAS into the Nation’s airspace.” 97
The rule’s provisions are designed to minimize risks to other
aircraft and people and property on the ground. The regulations
require pilots to keep an unmanned aircraft within visual line
of sight. Operations are allowed during daylight and during
twilight if the drone has anti-collision lights. The new
regulations also address height and speed restrictions and other
operational limits, such as prohibiting flights over unprotected
people on the ground who aren’t directly participating in the
UAS operation. 98

Essentially, Rule 107 creates an operational version of the
temporary restrictions, leaving most of them in place with only
minor changes. 99 Consequently, the FAA’s efforts continue to fall
woefully short in addressing the use of drones to collect data on
people or property. 100
A regulatory regime that does not address the technical
capabilities of this technology presents a great risk to the future
subjects of its application. 101 Without guidance, courts will
97. See Press Release—DOT and FAA Finalize Rules for Small Unmanned
AVIATION
ADMIN.
(June
21,
2016),
Aircraft
Systems,
FED.
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=20515
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2016) [hereinafter DOT and FAA Finalize Rules] (describing the
main goals of the “first operational set of rules for routine commercial use of small
unmanned aircraft systems” and outlining Rule 107’s goals from a policy
perspective) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. Id.
99. See id. (outlining restrictions on line-of-sight piloting, maximum height
and speed restrictions, daytime-only flight permissions, pilot age restrictions, and
“remote pilot certificate” requirements). Note that Rule 107 essentially mirrors
the temporary restrictions explained previously, at least with regard to its focus
on the physical attributes of the drone and the conduct of its flight pattern. See
supra notes 93–95 (outlining the focal points of the temporary Section 333
exemption and temporary restrictions set out by the FAA).
100. See DOT and FAA Finalize Rules, supra note 97;
Although the new rule does not specifically deal with privacy issues in
the use of drones, and the FAA does not regulate how UAS gather data
on people or property, the FAA is acting to address privacy
considerations in this area. The FAA strongly encourages all UAS
pilots to check local and state laws before gathering information
through remote sensing technology or photography.
Id.
101. See Margot E. Kaminski, The Rules of the Sky, SLATE (Feb. 25, 2015, 7:47
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/02/faa_small_
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struggle to evaluate the fairness of drones’ analytics, calculations,
and data collection through a legal lens. 102 As a result, unfair
discriminatory insurance practices may become inevitable where a
court has only subjective state law to go on and no guidance in
evaluating the effects of the technology itself. 103 As of now, the
government’s efforts to provide this guidance through commercial
drone regulations have fallen woefully short. 104
IV. Potential Influences of Risk Assessment Drones on Unfairly
Discriminatory Insurance Practices and Disparate Impacts
The question remains what effect the introduction of
commercial drones will have on unfairly discriminatory insurance
practices and whether their use will result in disparate impacts.
Exploration of these effects is largely hypothetical, considering the
limited use of drones to date. 105 This, however, does not dampen
the importance of understanding the trajectory of this technology

commercial_drone_rules_don_t_adequately_address_privacy_concerns.2.html (last
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (arguing that the FAA’s current “ad hoc” certification system,
as well as the proposed rules it has produced, are overly concerned with aircraft
safety and operation, and not concerned with the cameras and capabilities of the
drones, and the consequences they carry) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
102. See Jeremy Kun, Big Data Algorithms Can Discriminate, and It’s Not
Clear What to Do About It, GOV’T TECH. (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Big-Data-Algorithms-Can-Discriminateand-Its-Not-Clear-What-to-Do-About-It.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (arguing
that “an even deeper problem [with evaluating fairness of data collection
algorithms] is that nobody has agreed on what it means for an algorithm to be
fair in the first place”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
103. See supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text (discussing how courts are
forced to apply subjective patterns of analysis to “fairness” evaluations and how
state anti-discrimination laws often muddle these analyses further through
inconsistency in construction and application).
104. See Drones Take Flight, LLOYD’S EMERGING RISK REP. 3 (2015),
https://www.lloyds.com/~/media/files/news%20and%20insight/risk%20insight/20
15/drones%20take%20flight20150820.pdf (“[T]he industry is growing too rapidly
and unevenly for regulators to provide strong oversight without technological
support.”).
105. See supra notes 79–81 (stating that only four insurers have temporary
“testing” exemptions to use risk assessment drones, and discussing their
reasoning for implementation).
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in the insurance field and how readily available it will become. 106
Underestimating the evolution of drones and their commercial
capabilities could prove costly to those individuals who find
themselves at the mercy of their implementation. 107
The central thesis of this Note is that, without adequately
tailored regulation, the introduction of insurance risk assessment
drones will create a rise in unfairly discriminatory insurance
practices. 108 Risk assessment drones aim to eliminate the need for
human interaction in many situations, 109 can gather and process
rapid amounts of previously unavailable data and details, 110 and
may potentially share data with other entities to the detriment of
the individuals being assessed. 111 Each issue potentially creates
serious difficulties for courts and lawmakers in evaluating the
fairness of these practices. Insurers claim that their
implementation of risk assessment drones is meant to work in
106. See Lyle Donan, The Drones Are Here, CLAIMS MGMT. (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://claims-management.theclm.org/home/article/drones-unmanned-aerialvehicles-coming-to-property-insurance-claims-industry (last visited Oct. 1, 2016)
(“UAVs eventually will enjoy widespread adoption throughout our industry, and
one day in the foreseeable future they will be commonplace.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
107. See Peter W. Singer, The Predator Comes Home: A Primer on Domestic
Drones, Their Huge Business Opportunities, and Their Deep Political, Moral, and
(Mar.
8,
2013),
Legal
Challenges,
BROOKINGS
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/03/08-drones-singer (last visited
Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the “explosion of new types [of drones], ranging in size,
shape, and form” and how these changes are ushering in a “crucial opening-up of
the user base and functionality of robotics,” meaning that far less training,
understanding, and certification is required to pilot today’s drones) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
108. See supra notes 101–103 (discussing the need for an appropriately
focused regulatory regime and the potential consequences if one is not generated
before the introduction of insurance drones technology).
109. See Donan, supra note 106 (“There is a clear motive for us to use [drones]
where they can . . . gather intelligence more cost effectively than with human
labor.”).
110. See id. (“There is a clear motive for us to use [drones] where they
can . . . aid in gathering intelligence and scaling up intelligence gathering efforts
quickly); supra notes 82–83 (discussing the data collection technology and
capabilities of risk assessment drones, as well as their ability to transfer data to
other sources and recipients).
111. See supra notes 85–86 (discussing drone communication and third-party
transmission capabilities, as well as instant-upload and cloud-based sharing
software available to commercial drones).
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tandem with human agents, not faze them out. 112 However, the
potential consequences loom larger than insurers would like to
admit, and the American public remains skeptical. 113
A. Erosion of the Relationship Between Insurers and Insureds
To begin, the introduction of drones into insurance practices
necessitates a decrease in human interaction during property
surveillance, claims adjustment, and risk assessment. 114 Insurers’
desire to use drones to reach areas that are inaccessible to humans,
as well as to gather and analyze large portions of data in real time,
supports this inevitability. 115 Specifically, Erie Insurance stated
that they would use test drones to replace human agents in certain
underwriting and claims processes. 116 Immediate concerns arise
over the number and competency of those individuals operating the
drones in practice. 117 Some argue that this reduction in the human
112. See Young Ha, Erie Insurance Receives FAA Approval to Use Drones in
Claims, Underwriting, INS. J. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal.
com/news/east/2015/04/15/364525.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review)
At ERIE, we see drones as high tech meets human touch . . . . Drones
will help our claims adjusters get an early look at potential damage
without putting themselves in harm’s way due to unsafe conditions,
such as on a steep roof or at the site of a fire or natural disaster.
Id.
113. See Joan Lowy & Jennifer Agiesta, Americans Skeptical Benefits of
Commercial Drones Will Outweigh Privacy, Safety Risks, SUAS NEWS (Dec. 19,
2014), http://www.suasnews.com/2014/12/33443/americans-skeptical-benefits-ofcommercial-drones-will-outweigh-privacy-safety-risks/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016)
(“By a 2-1 margin, those who had an opinion opposed using drones for commercial
purposes. Only 21 percent favored commercial use of drones, compared with 43
percent opposed. Another 35 percent were in the middle.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
114. See supra notes 79–81 (naming the insurers currently approved for
exemptions to use risk assessment drones and the stated goal of USAA to use
them in an effort to reduce the number of human agents working in the field).
115. See supra notes 109–110 (dissecting the insurers’ desire and
commentators’ calls for risk assessment drones to replace human agents, reach
inaccessible areas, and increase the size and speed of data collection and
analysis).
116. See Ha, supra note 112 (“Erie Insurance said the company will be using
two drones it currently has for claims and underwriting. ‘We’ll be using the two
drones we have for claims and for underwriting rather than simply research.’”).
117. See Donan, supra note 106 (“Professional training programs also will be
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workforce is not necessarily a present concern because
professionals are still often required to evaluate the drones’
operations and collected data. 118 While that may be true, the major
issue remains whether the denial of the opportunity to interact
personally with an insurance agent constitutes or promotes
unfairly discriminatory insurance practices.
“The insurer has a duty to conduct a ‘reasonable investigation’
before denying a claim.” 119 Failure to reasonably investigate claims
before denial may result in extended liability through “bad faith
insurance claims practices as defined by [the relevant statute].” 120
At best, it is questionable whether an investigation without
meaningful interaction between the insurer and insured is
“reasonable.” 121 Such interaction allows for explanations,
discussions, and a free exchange of information before or during a
thorough analysis, and has traditionally been considered integral
to the claims adjustment process. 122 By eliminating this
relationship, society risks promoting a process where robotic
analytics pre-determine the rating of an individual or group
without offering them a chance to be heard. 123 Consider AIG’s own
necessary . . . even an experienced pilot would know that you cannot just grab the
sticks of a UAV controller and be a safe, competent operator overnight. The
necessary skills take time to practice, learn, and refine.”).
118. See id. (dismissing immediate concerns over drones “simply [replacing]
the human workforce one day” because “the data they collect can be cumbersome
and complex” and is “often useless without professional evaluation”).
119. 1 JEFFREY E. THOMAS & FRANCIS J. MOOTZ, NEW APPLEMAN ON INS. LAW
LIB. ED. § 4.06(2) (2013).
120. Id.
121. This brings the debate back to the courts, which will struggle to
subjectively evaluate whether such a denial was fair or unfair without much
guidance from policy or regulation. See supra Part II (discussing generally the
current state of subjective standards for judicial evaluation of fairness and
reasonableness in potentially discriminatory insurance practices).
122. See
The
Claims
Adjustment
Process,
LAPOINTE
INS.,
http://www.lapointeins.com/claims-center/the-claims-adjustment/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the claims adjustment process, highlighting the
interaction between claims adjusters and the insured through a home visit or a
series of visits, and the need for a full preparation and exchange of information
and details between the adjuster and the insured to ensure “a thorough and
complete evaluation”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
123. See Paul J. Gough, Erie Insurance Hopes These Are Drones They’re
Looking for, PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015, 7:49 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/blog/morning-edition/2015/04/erie-insur
ance-hopes-these-are-drones-theyre.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing
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vision for its risk assessment drones, which focuses on the
relationship between the agent and his drone, not the agent and
the insured. 124 It is no great leap to realize the severity of allowing
such practices to become the norm without adequate constraints.
Without a consistent guidepost, how can courts be expected to
evaluate the fairness or reasonableness of this rapid evolution that
potentially alienates the insured? 125
B. Potential Abuse of Data-Collection Capabilities
The unprecedented data-collection capabilities of drones
simultaneously present one of their biggest advantages and one of
their greatest discriminatory risks. 126 The obvious advantage of
commercial drones in claims adjustment and risk assessment is
that they are capable of viewing, scanning, and analyzing large
spaces in detail. 127 Insurers envision this data as “another tool in
Erie Insurance Co.’s exploration into commercial risk assessment and
underwriting drones, and posing the question of whether “a robotic claims
adjuster [is] far behind?”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
company is even exploring drones and robots capable of traversing the actual
terrain of an insured’s home to analyze it. See id. (“[Erie Insurance] has even been
in exploratory talks with a company that makes robots that can move across an
asphalt shingle.”).
124. See Poised to Take off: A Harvard Business Review Analytic Services
Report, HARV. BUS. REV. 4 (2015), http://www.aig.com/Chartis/internet/US/en/
19460_HBR_AIG%20Report_UAV_tcm3171-709936.pdf (discussing an AIGsponsored report stating that “UASs can also improve underwriting, enabling
carriers to more accurately assess candidates for insurance . . . by determining
the probability of damage to buildings, helping insurers to determine where they
should assign high deductibles, and advising the insured on loss prevention
measures”). The report goes on to espouse the same goals mentioned in this Note
by other insurers, focusing on efficiency and the reduction of the need for site
visits and specialists. See id. (“UASs can make the claims adjustment process less
expensive and time-consuming by cutting down on the need for multiple site visits
by different specialists.”).
125. See supra Part II (discussing generally the current discrepancies in the
substantive evaluations of state courts and the lack of consistency and
predictability in their evaluation of fairness in challenges to discriminatory
insurance practices).
126. See MEASURE, INC., supra note 85, at 90 (describing common
high-resolution cameras and laser-mapping features of risk assessment and other
commercial surveillance drones, as well as other data collection and sharing
capabilities).
127. See id. (describing commercial drone data-gathering capabilities); see
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the toolbox” for claims adjusters and underwriters when
evaluating property. 128 Some have even postulated that these
drones can transfer collected data to third parties (such as
attorneys) to streamline the process. 129 Lost in this excitement,
however, is the potential for discriminatory insurance practices
resulting from an unfair abuse of these abilities.
Discriminatory insurance practices can take many forms,
including a practice commonly referred to as redlining. 130 Insurers
have long toed the line between fair and unfair discrimination in
the rating and underwriting processes; however, many courts have
found redlining to be a line in the sand. 131 While insurers argue
that there is a demonstrated need for some discrimination in risk
classification, 132 courts have not extended their sympathies nearly
generally supra Part III (discussing generally the current state of commercial
drone technology, including common hardware and software, cameras, lasermapping, and data sharing).
128. See Gough, supra note 123 (quoting Erie Insurance as describing the use
of drones in underwriting and claims adjustment as “another tool in the toolbox”
for its insurance agents).
129. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (describing cloud-based
computing and data-sharing software in commercial drones, and discussing the
potential uses of that software for third-party data sharing and storage).
130. See Emily Badger, Redlining: Still a Thing, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG
(May 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/28/
evidence-that-banks-still-deny-black-borrowers-just-as-they-did-50-years-ago/
(last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the roots of redlining stemming from the
Home Owner’s Loan Corporation’s practice of drafting maps of American
communities throughout the 1930s to determine which citizens were “worthy of
mortgage lending”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The article
goes on to describe redlining’s racial connotations throughout history and its
continuance in certain forms today. See id. (detailing the FHA’s outlawing of the
practice in 1968 and subsequent practices that continued, such as predatory
lending and banking tactics, “retail redlining,” and the housing discrimination
case between Associated Banking and HUD in Wisconsin in 2008).
131. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (discussing the Cisneros
court’s definition of redlining as any situation where the insurer charges higher
rates or declines to write insurance for people who live in particular areas and its
holding that such practices were unfairly discriminatory within the constraints
of the relevant statute).
132. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 5 (asserting that laws limiting risk
classification practices that resemble redlining “implicate a tradeoff between
efficiency and fairness” and that, while this limitation is necessary, these laws
can promulgate poor rating systems if no discrimination is allowed); see, e.g.,
Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification,
71 VA. L. REV. 403, 420–50 (1985) (reiterating the concept of the efficiency/fairness
tradeoff and the importance of a balance between limiting insurers’ ability to
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as far as insurers would like. 133 Courts (and other parties) who
support limitations on insurance discrimination often champion
fairness-based arguments, highlighting the danger of fragmenting
communities through unfair risk classification. 134 The
data-collection capabilities of risk assessment drones present a
tempting Pandora’s box from which new forms of redlining may be
released if left unchecked. 135 Insurers have already shown their
willingness to use evolving technology such as satellite imagery to
push the discriminatory envelope under the guise of efficiency. 136
In many cases, although the state regulators condemn the practice
as unfairly discriminatory redlining, they lack the legal capability
to stop it. 137 One article quotes Insurance Commissioner John
discriminate and allowing for some necessary consideration of differing risks
presented by each policyholder); Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, Regulating Genetic
Information in Insurance Markets, 8 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 211, 211–12 (2005)
(“Economists can contribute to this debate [about regulating genetic information
in insurance markets] . . . . [B]y casting the problem as a classic efficiency-equity
trade-off. . . .”).
133. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (reiterating the Cisneros
holding).
134. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 6 (“[Fairness-based] arguments embrace
a vision of insurance as [a] solidarity . . . . Risk classification undermines this
vision . . . by splitting communities into ever smaller and more fragmented risk
pools, particularly when it trades on preexisting social inequities and
stereotypes.”). “Even when actuarial correlations between characteristics and
risk can be demonstrated, defenders of risk classification regulation emphasize
that this correlation is socially constructed, reflecting existing norms,
assumptions, and biases that frame both the collection and analysis of the data
that produces risk assessments.” Id.
135. See generally supra Part III (giving a general primer on current models
of commercial drones and the technological capabilities they possess or may
possess in the near future).
136. See Insurers Using Satellite Photos to Determine Fire Risk, INS. J. (Sept.
27, 2004), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2004/09/27/46293.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (detailing a California insurer’s use of satellite imagery
to deny renewal of coverage to individuals whose property was located near wild
brush, and discussing the state regulators’ condemnation of the practice as
redlining that could lead to arbitrary cancellation of policies) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
137. See id. (“[S]tate regulators say the practice is a form of redlining,
discriminating against particular neighborhoods, and could lead to policies being
arbitrarily canceled. Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi called it a serious
problem but said he does not have the legal right to stop it.”). Insurers argued for
the positive aspects of the practice, focusing on efficiency instead of fairness. See
id. (“Pete Moraga, spokesman for Insurance Information Network of California, a
media relations organization supported by insurers, said use of satellite
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Garamendi as he condemns the practice further: “Insurance
companies are using satellite imagery and just plain photos to
redline vast areas of the state without taking into account the
individual circumstances of an individual home.” 138 The public
largely shares this aversion to such abuses of technology in the
underwriting process. 139 It is not difficult, then, to envision a
similar struggle with operations of risk assessment drones that
result in insurers’ unchecked access to data without interaction
with the insured. 140
C. Unchecked Information-Sharing with Third Parties
Finally, the potential for risk assessment drones to transfer
the information they collect and analyze to third parties without
the insured’s knowledge or consent is a concern too great to ignore.
Data sharing has been lauded as a valuable attribute of many
drones, including those aimed at risk assessment and claims
adjustment. 141 In the age of cloud-based data sharing and
seemingly unlimited access to information, this evolution has
naturally expanded to drones. 142 Gathering, processing, and
technology may prove to be positive if it makes the industry more efficient.”).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., id. (interviewing Sheree DiCicco, a policyholder denied coverage
due to her property’s proximity to brush—“I didn’t know insurance companies
would, or even could, do such a thing”). The article also quotes Harvey Rosenfield,
the Spokesman for the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights. See id.
(“I’d not heard of this before; it’s scary. . . . It has a creepy, intrusive aspect to it.”).
140. See id. (“Increasingly, however, insurance companies are using satellites
to identify homes at high risk of fire damage because of their proximity to brush,
a development that alarms some state regulators . . . .”). Compare this satellite
usage to the routine sweeps and scans of the property surrounding an area using
a drone’s on-board cameras during an assessment or claims adjustment
envisioned by insurers like Erie Insurance and AIG, and a disconcerting
similarity in operation emerges. See Gough, supra note 123 (discussing Erie
Insurance’s vision of drones being used to aid in underwriting and property
assessment); HARV. BUS. REV., supra note 124, at 4 (describing AIG’s intent to use
drones to assess the probability of damage to buildings (similar to the satellite
usage) and help insurers determine where they should assign high deductibles).
141. See MEASURE, INC., supra note 85, at 7 (exploring the third-party
transmission and data-sharing capabilities of the latest models of commercial
drones).
142. See Colin Snow, Drones Revolution Means Big Data Cloud Services,
DIGITALIST MAG. (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.digitalistmag.com/digital-
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sharing data is often considered the primary goal of most
commercial drone operations. 143 Anything beyond a cursory glance
at the current landscape, however, reveals the dangers of this
unfettered information exchange. 144 Insurers could potentially
share data with third-party experts, evaluators, or even other
agencies without the knowledge or consent of the insured, and may
even use “middle-man” companies to process and share this
data. 145
State legislatures have already shown that the transfer and
disclosure of information pertaining to private property will not be
treated lightly. 146 Rules and regulations limiting data collection,
economy/2014/02/18/drones-revolution-and-big-data-cloud-services-01244771
(last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the future of data sharing and analytics
through cloud-based software in drones, including PrecisionHawk’s
PrecisionMapper service, which it calls “a cloud-based application that gives
anyone the ability to upload, store, process, and share their aerial image data”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
143. See id. (discussing drones’ prolific application as data-collection vehicles
that can process and share massive amounts of data in useful formats to third
parties and consumers, such as farm and crop data like crop yield, feed and
livestock replenishing windows, and other micro-analyses).
144. After all, insurers are beginning to use shared information from other
technological providers, such as social media, to adjust premiums and conduct
risk-discriminatory underwriting. See Anita Ramasastry, Will Insurers Begin to
Use Social Media Postings to Calculate Premiums?, VERDICT (Jan. 3, 2012),
https://verdict.justia.com/2012/01/03/will-insurers-begin-to-use-social-mediapostings-to-calculate-premiums (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (explaining comments
regarding current insurer uses of social media posts and profiles to detect fraud
or misrepresentations, and examining predictions from insurance analysts that
the insurance industry is and will continue to trend towards research activity that
will aid in underwriting and risk discrimination) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
145. See Denise Johnson, In-Depth Study Reveals How Drones Can Help in
J.
(May
18,
2015),
All
Phases
of
a
Disaster,
CLAIMS
http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2015/05/18/263420.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the practical applications of real-time data processing
and sharing through risk assessment and claims adjustment drones, as well as
the use of third-party companies like Measure, Inc., to process and share the data
with parties as directed by the insurer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The article used the example of assessment and claims adjustment
during pre- and post-disaster efforts. See id. (discussing how data sharing and
middle man companies could aid insurers by processing and sharing the data as
needed so that insurers need not maintain a large drone fleet).
146. See Amy O’Connor, Insurers Warned to ‘Think Before You Snap’ as
Florida Drone Privacy Law Takes Flight, INS. J. (July 29, 2015),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2015/07/29/376560.htm (last
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transfer, exchange, and access are necessary to protect
policyholders. 147 Without them, insurers and third parties may
share information they would not have otherwise had access to and
produce discriminatory assessments and ratings. 148
The introduction of commercial drones into commercial
fields like risk assessment and claims adjustment is clearly
inevitable. 149 However, with new technology comes a responsibility
to develop and maintain adequate, proactive policy standards
governing its use. 150 This Note does not fear the age of the drone,
nor herald their coming as some imminent doom of the insured. 151
This Note is not a zealous prophet of some great technopanic. 152
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (examining a Florida law that prohibits image-capturing of
a person or their private property unless it is within the scope of authorization,
and discussing the uncertainty as to how courts will approach insurers’ collection
and sharing of data via drones for risk assessment and claims adjustment) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This Note does not discuss drone
privacy issues in detail, but the overlap between privacy concerns and the
potential for unfairly discriminatory practices through the acquisition of
drone-gathered data via unilateral sharing is worth noting. See id. (“The
insurance industry is all about managing risk and the moral of the story is think
before you snap that picture . . . . Instead, identify the use of drone technology in
the insurance policy and let the insured know they may be filmed during the
adjustment process.”).
147. See Lindsey Harriman & Joseph Muhlhausen, A New Eye in the Sky: EcoGLOBAL
ENVTL.
ALERT
SERV.
1,
9
(2013),
Drones,
UNEP
http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP-GEAS_MAY_2013.pdf (discussing the need for
data sharing standards to be created for the operation of environmental mapping
and surveillance drones, especially in areas not native to the operator).
148. See id. (warning of the potential for unchecked data sharing to grant
people or entities access to data that they otherwise would not, or should not, have
had).
149. See id. at 9 (“According to a 2012 United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report, the number of countries with a UAV system
for military, commercial, or civil use grew from 41 countries in 2004 to 76
countries by 2011.”).
150. See id. (asserting that, “as UAVs become more prevalent in the public
and private sectors for research and non-military surveillance, many policy
considerations will need to be made,” and discussing several forms of regulation
that will likely be necessary for research and surveillance drones in the future).
151. See ADAM THERIER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE
FOR COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 22 (2014) (“Unsurprisingly,
however, private drones have also raised many safety, security, and privacy
concerns. . . . Many [advocates] fear that commercial drones will soon darken our
skies and create an omnipresent panopticon.”).
152. See id. at 21–22 (defining “technopanic” as “intense public, political, and
academic responses to the emergence or use of media or technologies,” and
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Instead, it aims to identify a glaring concern and the need to
address it. 153 Without a competent regulatory regime specifically
targeted at risk assessment and claims adjustment processes,
commercial drones remain an open door to redlining and other
discriminatory insurance practices. 154 Courts cannot be expected
to unify and create predictable standards of use on their own;
policyholders deserve a better system than state-by-state
regulation and a lack of predictable enforcement and restraint on
insurers. 155 The questions then posed are (1) what must be
included in such a regulatory scheme, and (2) who has the power
and ability to enact it? 156
V. Proposed Regulatory Framework for Insurance Drones
Proposing a sufficient regulatory framework for risk
assessment drones requires (1) an understanding of current
regulatory efforts towards commercial drones, 157 (2) an
identifying root causes and trends that inspire this fear and drive activism
against technological innovation).
153. See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text (restating the thesis of
this Note as the potential for an increase in unfairly discriminatory insurance
practices resulting from the introduction of commercial risk assessment drones).
154. See supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text (discussing insurers’
current usage of evolving technology to discriminate in underwriting and risk
assessment, and drawing parallels to potential uses of drone technology).
155. See Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for
Legislators, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION BROOKINGS 1, 4 (2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/10/dronesaerial-surveillancelegislators/Drones_Aerial_Surveillance_McNeal_FINAL.pdf?la=en (introducing
the impending conflicts brought by commercial drones, and recommending core
considerations for legislators, including a property rights approach to aerial
surveillance, strict data retention, storage, and transfer procedures, transparency
and accountability for operators, and duration-based surveillance regulations).
156. See id. at 2 (discussing the current state of drone legislation and its focus
on technological capabilities as opposed to perceived or recognized harms, and the
inadequacies that have followed, introducing ideas of what might be included in
a better regulatory scheme, and noting the importance of having the right parties
enact reforms).
157. See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text (outlining the current
regulatory schemes introduced by the FAA, preliminary restrictions on
commercial drone use, the process for exemptions, and its limitation in scope). See
generally Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (framing the FAA’s task of creating rules

1578

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1549 (2016)

examination of how risk assessment drones may leave individuals
susceptible to unfairly discriminatory practices and what
countermeasures are available against those risks, and (3) an
evaluation of which entities (if any) are suitable to introduce such
countermeasures. 158
Drone use in the commercial context is still a regulatory blank
slate, relying only on temporary FAA operational standards. 159
Industry-specific uses, particularly in an insurance risk
assessment and claims adjustment context, have yet to be
addressed in detail. 160 While the current FAA structure offers only
for the integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace, and
discussing the preliminary restrictions in place while rulemaking is underway).
158. See Thomas Gounley, Commercial Use of Drones: With Strict FAA
Regulation, Some Locally Wait for Exemption, Others Just Fly, SPRINGFIELD
NEWS-LEADER
(July
2,
2015),
http://www.newsleader.com/story/news/business/2015/07/15/commercial-use-drones-strict-faaregulation-locally-wait-exemption-others-just-fly/30146599/ (last visited Oct. 1,
2016) (interviewing various entrepreneurs to demonstrate the FAA’s current
monopoly on allowing or restricting any commercial operation of UAVs) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). However, many suggest that the
FAA’s ability to regulate and restrict commercial drone operation in the national
airspace is limited, both in the scope of coverage and applicability to the public.
See Peter Sachs, Current U.S. Federal Drone Law, DRONE L.J. (Dec. 14,
2013), http://dronelawjournal.com/ (last updated Dec. 25, 2015) (last visited Oct.
1, 2016) (discussing the current extent of FAA regulations on commercial drone
operation, arguments that the FAA Modernization and Reform Act and the
proposed rulemakings for commercial drone integration do not always apply to
the general public, and commenting on the limitations in the scope of coverage of
current drone legislation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jeff
Foster, Keep Calm: The FAA and sUAVs/Drone Rules, PROVIDEO COALITION
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.provideocoalition.com/drone-law-update-faa (last
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“[T]he FAA can't make laws—only develop guidelines and
regulations. The federal government has no authority whatsoever to regulate the
operation of remote-controlled model aircraft.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
159. See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text (explaining the operation
of current FAA commercial drone regulations, the process of FAA’s proposed
rulemaking, the current process for obtaining an exemption, and the expected
trajectory and limits of the FAA’s rulemaking).
160. See Miriam McNabb, Regulations Matter: 3 Regions Crushing the U.S. in
Drone Industry, DRONELIFE.COM (Jan. 8, 2016), http://dronelife.com/2016/01/08/
regulations-matter-3-regions-crushing-the-u-s-in-drone-industry/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing the United States’ lack of industry-specific guidelines
and regulations for companies wishing to enter the market and the economic
impact this is having as those entities pursue activity in drone-friendly climates
like China and Brazil) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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preliminary testing exemptions, 161 drone technology will most
likely spread to the insurance industry in the coming years.
Without targeted restrictions from appropriate entities on usage,
data collection, analysis, and information sharing, the likelihood of
abuse resulting in unfairly discriminatory insurance practices
remains dangerously high.
A. Current Regulatory Efforts and Inadequacies
At the outset, it is prudent to take stock of current regulatory
efforts that will impact the integration of commercial drones into
the insurance industry. 162 As discussed previously, the FAA has
been tasked with facilitating commercial drone integration into the
national airspace across all industries and uses. 163 The scope of the
FAA’s mandate, however, is limited to regulating the physical
operation and registration of drones in the airspace. 164 This narrow
authority, combined with a sluggish preliminary regulatory period,
has led to uncertainty as to the future of industry-specific
regulations for this evolving technology. 165 Current efforts focus on
the operator’s flight conditions and visibility, as well as maximum
altitude and drone size restrictions. 166 In addition, initial
161. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (discussing the scope,
process, and requirements of a temporary exception to “test” commercial drone
operations).
162. See generally supra Part III (discussing the development of commercial
drone integration restrictions, exemptions, and other FAA processes).
163. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA’s mandate
on national airspace integration, and providing general background on the
Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 and its
implications).
164. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-381, at 64 (2012) (Conf. Rep.) (detailing the
objectives of Section 332 of the Act, which focus on the FAA’s mandate to provide
for “acceptable standards for operation and certification of civil unmanned
aircraft,” and prioritizing registration and operator certification procedures).
165. See Alan Levin, FAA’s Power to Police Civilian Drones Bolstered by
BUS.
(Nov.
18,
2014,
8:48
AM),
Decision,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-18/drone-flights-over-sportsevents-subject-to-faa-rules-ntsb-says (last updated Nov. 18, 2014, 2:49 PM) (last
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“[T]here are still unresolved questions about how drone
flights will be regulated and a community of users increasingly frustrated with
the FAA’s slow action . . . . At least three other court cases challenging FAA
authority are pending.”) (on file the with Washington and Lee Law Review).
166. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (listing the requirements for
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regulatory attempts by the FAA and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) imposed mandatory registration and fee
requirements for commercial pilots. 167 However, any positive
impact of this legislation was tempered because the exemption
format prohibited commercial users from piloting without a
registered exemption—essentially presenting an analogous
registration-style barrier. 168 This registration scheme operates as
a logistical hindrance on the industry rather than a regulatory aid
to integration, and odds are its successors will similarly inhibit
progress. 169 Some have even alleged that the FAA’s efforts are in
danger of violating the constitutional requirements of due
process. 170 The publication of Final Rule 107 has done little to allay
receiving an exemption under Section 333 of the Act, focusing on weight,
maximum altitude, and visual line of sight requirements for the drone and
operator); see also supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
limitations of Final Rule 107 and the FAA’s intentional focus on physical flight
restrictions and disregard of data collection and privacy issues).
167. See Keith Laing, Feds Announce Drone Registration Requirements, HILL
(Dec. 14, 2015, 10:17 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/263106-fedsannounce-drone-registration-requirements (Oct. 1, 2016) (“The [DOT] said drone
users will have to register their devices by Feb. 19, 2016, in a new Web-based
tracking system . . . . The agency is imposing a $5 fee for drone
registrations . . . but the FAA said it is waiving the charge for the first 30 days of
the new requirement.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
168. See Petitioning for Exemption, supra note 93 (outlining the procedure for
procuring an exemption for pre-regulation commercial drone “testing,” and
discussing the prohibition of flights not authorized by such an exemption).
169. See Laing, supra note 167 (“Drone advocates had urged the FAA not to
impose registration fees in the new documentation system that is being set up to
help the federal government keep track of the devices, arguing that the charge
would deter drone operators from complying with the new requirements.”); Eli
Dourado, The Government Is Rushing Out an Ill-Conceived Plan to Regulate
TECH.
(Nov.
12,
2015,
8:30
AM),
Consumer
Drones,
VOX
http://www.vox.com/2015/11/12/9716350/drones-obama-faa-christmas
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“Unless the FAA decides to exempt small, consumer drones,
kids who get Millennium Falcon drones for Christmas may have to wait until they
are registered with the FAA to play with them—or face jail time.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
170. See Keith Laing, Critics Threaten Lawsuit Over Drone Registration
Rules, THE HILL (Dec. 14, 2015, 3:12 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/
263164-critics-threaten-lawsuit-over-faa-drone-registration-rules (last visited
Oct. 4, 2016) (“The Washington, D.C.-based Competitive Enterprise Institute said
Monday the FAA violated federal requirements for allowing public comments on
the drone registration proposal, which usually lasts for a period of 30 to 60 days.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Marc Scribner, transportation
policy expert for the Competitive Enterprise Institute, stated “The FAA’s claim
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these concerns, due in large part to the fact that restrictions on
piloting are vague, apply only to small-scale, non-hobby
commercial drones, and still require permit-style certificates of
authorization for flight. 171
With specific regard to the insurance industry, it appears that
the FAA may have some power to regulate acceptable data
collection, use, and sharing guidelines. 172 Although this power
seems limited to approval, it remains controversial due to the lack
of data collection laws. 173 Many interest groups and political
watchdogs have already spoken towards issues of privacy and
security, 174 but commentary from similar players on
industry-specific uses for commercial drones—including insurance
that complying with notice and comment requirements for small drone
registration regulation is ‘impracticable and contrary to the public interest,’ so
that it can therefore ignore them, is as predictable as it is absurd.” Id.
171. See Press Release, supra note 97 (“To qualify for a remote pilot certificate,
an individual must either pass an initial aeronautical knowledge test at an FAAapproved knowledge testing center or have an existing non-student Part 61 pilot
certificate.”).
172. See John Dyer, FAA Approves Corporation’s Use of Drones to Collect
Data, Prompting Protest from Privacy Advocates, VICE NEWS (Sep. 2, 2015, 4:53
PM),
https://news.vice.com/article/faa-approves-corporations-use-of-drones-tocollect-data-prompting-protest-from-privacy-advocates (last visited Oct. 1, 2016)
(detailing the FAA’s approval of Measure, Inc.’s commercial drone exemption for
a fleet of “aerial data acquisition” drones, mostly to be used for disaster relief
efforts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
173. See id. (“‘Right now there are virtually no laws to address the commercial
use of drones to collect massive amounts of data on the public,’ said Jeramie Scott,
national security counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center . . . .
‘Drones are basically flying surveillance platforms . . . .’”).
174. See The Canadian Press, Drones Should Be Restricted Near Homes,
Schoolyards, Privacy Watchdog Says, CBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2015, 12:27 PM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/drones-privacy-commissioner-1.3299892 (last
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“Drones can be outfitted with high-powered zoom lenses,
night-vision or infrared-imaging systems, and video software that can recognize
specific people . . . . These features demand an emphasis on personal protection
in regulations and licensing standards, the commissioner's office says in its
submission to the advisory council.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Michelle L. Price, States Are Itching to Use Drones, But Privacy
Watchdogs Say Not So Fast, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2014, 8:17 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/11/states-drones-privacy_n_4940365.html
(last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing various legislative efforts of Utah,
California, and other western states, as well as the positions of lobbyists like
Citizens Education Project, in regards to integrating drone usage into use by state
agencies, police, and other official groups, as well as commercial entities) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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practices—has been scarce. After the FAA’s latest publication, it
appears they will continue to avert their gaze from these issues in
disappointing—but not necessarily surprising—fashion. 175
Congress has tasked some agencies with researching and
compiling “best practices” for commercial drone use. 176 However,
many of these are likely outside of the insurance scope and amount
to little more than non-binding guidelines for use. 177 Consequently,
it is clear that current efforts have done little to point the
insurance industry’s use of commercial drones in a comprehensible
direction. 178
B. Identification of Risks and Exploration of Countermeasures to
Unfair Discrimination and Disparate Impact
Although the constitutional and regulatory landscapes remain
barren for now, 179 all is not lost for insureds that find themselves
175. See supra notes 99–100 (quoting Final Rule 107 to demonstrate that it
does not address the use of drones for data collection of people and property and
that the FAA is still “gathering data” on such issues).
176. See Harley Geiger, CDT Proposes Privacy Best Practices For Drones, CTR.
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Dec. 16, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/cdt-proposes-privacybest-practices-for-drones/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“CDT is proposing
comprehensive voluntary privacy best practices for private use of drones—both
commercial and non-commercial.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
177. See Voluntary Best Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and
Accountability, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/combined_draft_working_group_
12_22_2015.pdf (discussing the NTIA’s federal mandate to receive public notice
and comment and issue “best practices” for commercial and private drone use,
which recommend practices for everything from data security to maintaining a
familiarity with evolving federal regulation).
178. See Drones—Unmanned Airsystems, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_drones.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2016) (stating that “[w]ith the commercial use of drones expected to expand
rapidly in about five years, it is paramount to have established rules regulating
their use,” and underscoring the lack of current industry-specific regulations on
drone use) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
179. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding
that aerial surveillance photography used primarily for mapmaking and “site
inspection” was not an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment);
McNeal, supra note 155, at 6–8 (discussing the development of Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the subject of aerial surveillance technology, including Fourth
Amendment implications, and the potential conflict that commercial and private
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at the mercy of these autonomous agents. Previously, this Note
addressed certain discriminatory insurance practices looming as
dangerous consequences of the drone revolution. 180 The next step
is to identify countermeasures against unfair discrimination and
disparate impact in the context of risk assessment and claims
adjustment, a process that some states have already begun. 181 This
will generate a much-needed policy framework addressing the
collection, sharing, and discriminatory applications of dronegathered information. 182
1. Method for Identifying Potential Risks and Countermeasures
First and foremost, we must decide the method by which these
regulatory countermeasures are identified and constructed. Some
interested scholars recommend avoiding broad, sweeping
restrictions like the FAA’s current efforts. 183 This is because, in
any context, a lack of specificity does more harm than good,
drone use poses due to a lack of regulations addressing how they fit into that
jurisprudence).
180. See generally supra Part IV (discussing unfairly discriminatory
insurance practices and the increase in their potential through the integration of
commercial drones into the risk assessment and claims adjustment processes).
181. See Amy Clarke Burns, S.C. Considers the Promise and Potential for
Abuse of Drones, STATE (Aug. 19, 2015, 8:18 PM), http://www.
thestate.com/news/state/south-carolina/article31578377.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2016) (describing the conflict between the advance of commercial drones and an
inadequate regulatory landscape, and talking about how some states, like South
Carolina, are not waiting for FAA regulations before introducing regulatory
legislation at the state level) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Some of these efforts have crossed into creating criminal offenses for the misuse
of commercial drones that could apply even outside of the risk assessment and
claims adjustment context. See id. (“South Carolina’s pending bill would amend
state law regarding trespassing to make it illegal to fly drones ‘upon or above the
land of another.’”).
182. See id. (“‘With the newness and technology, we’ve got to have some
guidelines that people have to follow under the law of what’s permissible,’ said
state Sen. Thomas Alexander, a co-sponsor of the proposed legislation. ‘As we see
more and more of that capability, there needs to be some framework as to what’s
acceptable.’”).
183. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 24 (“Some jurisdictions have enacted
limitations on how information gathered from drones may be used. Legislators
should reject these broadly worded use restrictions that prohibit the use of any
evidence gathered by drones in nearly any proceeding.”).
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creating loopholes and exceptions that ultimately engulf the
rule. 184 The key here is to match potential dangers with individual,
customized solutions, and then unite them within a synergetic,
cohesive framework. 185 From there, coordination at the federal and
state levels will give this set of regulations the consistency
required to realize its full potential. 186 This creates sorely needed
predictability in enforcement for courts and legislators. 187 Gregory
McNeal applies the above methodology in suggesting a similar
regulatory approach for commercial drone use by the
government. 188 His goal is to create an “effective and clear
legislative package” that will address the multi-faceted concerns of
commercial drone integration. 189 If an analogous “package” can be
formulated through this Note’s proposal, the potential for unfair
discrimination at the hands of insurance drones will reduce
considerably.

184. See id. at 24–25 (exploring the situation in Alameda County, California,
where the sheriff’s department has proposed the use of drones for crime scene
analysis and surveillance, and evaluating the opposing concerns that highlight
the regulation’s inability to stop the sheriff from using the data for “untold other
purposes”).
185. As an analogous example, consider the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA)’s recent announcement of its commercial drone integration plan. See
Proposal to Create Common Rules for Operating Drones in Europe, EUROPEAN
AVIATION
SAFETY
ADMIN.
2
(Sept.
2015),
https://easa.europa.eu/
system/files/dfu/205933-01-EASA_Summary%20of%20the%20ANPA.pdf (proposing
a regulatory framework centered around three particular “categories of
operation” that are “based on the risk the operation is posing to third parties
(persons and property)”).
186. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 25 (suggesting that legislators should
codify their regulations and the specific exemptions to them so as to present an
obstacle to loophole arguments and promote consistent interpretation of the
regulations).
187. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (detailing the mass
inconsistencies and dearth of applicable law for courts and legislators to follow in
evaluating discriminatory practices for fairness, and discussing the lack of federal
legislation to direct the states in their efforts moving forward).
188. See generally McNeal, supra note 155 (laying out a framework of
considerations for legislators as they attempt to create regulations for the use of
commercial drones in government surveillance and imaging practices).
189. See id. at 28 (concluding that the best regulatory approach to issues
involving commercial drones is to avoid disrupting the “status quo” while
combining rules targeted at the surveillance practices, data retention, and
transparency by the user to create a “complete legislative package”).
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Having solidified the regulatory proposal’s modus operandi,
the discussion now turns to identifying the risks it must account
for if it is to succeed. Framed within a concern for potential
increases in unfairly discriminatory insurance practices, this Note
identifies many of the risks associated with the integration of risk
assessment and claims adjustment drones. 190 These risks include;
(1) a reduction in the presence of human agents on site, 191 (2) the
danger that insurance underwriting formulas will depend on data
that drones gather, analyze, and share without adequate
regulatory safeguards, 192 and (3) the burden on courts and
legislators to evaluate the fairness of any resulting discrimination,
including disparate impact and redlining. 193 Without regulatory
attention, these new risks will drastically alter the insurance
landscape, and the task of evaluating their consequences will only
grow more problematic. 194
2. Proposed Countermeasures
a. Minimum Visitation Requirement for Human Agents
A reduction in on-site human interaction during risk
assessment and claims adjustment would be problematic for the
190. See generally supra Part IV (exploring specific consequences of
commercial drone use in risk assessment and claims adjustment and their
potential to increase unfairly discriminatory insurance practices).
191. See supra notes 120–125 and accompanying text (highlighting the
importance of personal interaction between agents and policyholders in
conducting a “reasonable” investigation during risk assessment and claims
adjustment, and examining the consequences of reducing or eliminating this
presence).
192. See supra notes 136–140 and accompanying text (outlining the dangers
of abuse in data gathering, analysis, and sharing through commercial drones in
risk assessment and claims adjustment, and exploring how those dangers might
affect the underwriting process as it relies on such data).
193. See generally supra Part II (providing an overview of current
jurisprudence on discriminatory insurance practices, examining the deficiencies
in current subjective patterns of analysis courts use in evaluating these practices,
and hypothesizing the difficulties that commercial drone integration into the
insurance industry will impose on these evaluations).
194. See supra notes 29–42 and accompanying text (comparing examples of
court processes for evaluating discriminatory practices and discussing the
subjective nature of those analyses).

1586

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1549 (2016)

industry. 195 It is well established that the risk assessment process
balances interests in efficiency and fairness. 196 At what point,
however, are we willing to watch the former devour the latter
entirely? With the advent of drones that are capable of completely
replacing human agents, 197 our regulatory framework must ensure
a minimum level of interpersonal interaction in insurance
operations. If it fails to do so, the result could be the burial of
fairness in risk assessment altogether. 198
The goal of any regulatory scheme regarding risk assessment
and claims adjustment begins with a desire to avoid unfair
discrimination. 199 Imposing a minimum human visitation
requirement to risk assessment and claims adjustment sites
ensures due process and a reasonable investigation into any claim
or risk assessment. 200 More importantly, it allows policyholders to
remain an active part of the process. 201 Requiring signatures,
195. See supra notes 119–124 and accompanying text (examining the negative
effects of a reduction in interpersonal contact between policyholders and
insurance agents and claims adjusters during those processes).
196. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 5 (“Laws limiting risk classification in
insurance implicate a tradeoff between ‘efficiency’ and ‘fairness’ concerns.”).
197. See Hilary Rowen, The Flying Insurance Adjuster—Implications of
BNA
(May
14,
2015),
Insurers’
Use
of
Drones,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bna.com/flying-insurance-adjusterimplications-n17179926526/ (last
visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“Rather than having inspections done by a person peering
up from the ground, on a ladder or walking through a field, the inspections will
be done by a person looking at photos taken by a drone or reviewing a computer
analysis of data collected through drone-mounted sensors.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
198. See Avraham, supra note 19, at 21 (“First, fairness and efficiency
concerns often, though not always, cut in opposite directions. Trading off
efficiency and fairness concerns is what lawmakers are asked to do every day, but
predicting the outcome of such balancing is no easy task.”).
199. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing the core
principles behind standard rating and risk assessment policies, which include
avoiding inadequate or unfairly discriminatory results).
200. See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text (explaining that
insurance agents must conduct “reasonable investigations” during claims
adjustment to avoid bad faith accusations).
201. In his recommendations to legislators, Gregory McNeal discusses the
value of including the public in the loop of aerial surveillance and drone
operations. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 20–21 (chronicling the timeline of
helicopter and drone operations in the United Kingdom, and quoting several
officials who interpreted the public’s extremely positive response to increased
transparency and communication).
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statements from policyholders during on-site interviews, or the
completion of situational investigation “checklists” by insurance
agents would be straightforward methods of ensuring
compliance. 202 If a regulatory scheme does not safeguard some
form of personal contact, it is only a matter of time before insureds
are excluded from the process altogether. 203
b. Restrictions on Access, Retention, and Transfer of DroneGathered Data
Ensuring responsible, fair, and secure data practices is the
other primary goal of this regulatory scaffold. 204 The allure of risk
assessment drones lies not only in their ability to reach dangerous
and inaccessible areas, but also in their technological versatility. 205
These drones are equipped to capture, store, and even transmit
high volumes of data and imagery with incredible efficiency. 206 For
a system of regulation on these drones to have any teeth, the entire
202. Insurers consider many of these processes “tedious,” and investigations
and inspections often lack promptness and attention to detail, which these
requirements could remedy. See Chip Merlin, Contents Claim Adjusting Is
Tedious, Time Consuming and Few Insurance Carriers Do It Right, PROP. INS.
COVERAGE
L.
BLOG
(June
21,
2013),
http://www.property
insurancecoveragelaw.com/2013/06/articles/insurance/contents-claim-adjustingis-tedious-time-consuming-and-few-insurance-carriers-do-it-right/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2016) (discussing how a majority of insurers often lack promptness and
attention to detail during claims adjustments on contents and real property
damage and implying that there are certain bad faith incentives motivated by the
prospect of saving money) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
203. There is already a trend of alienating the policyholder during claims
adjustment, which could reach the point of no return if drones are introduced into
the process. See id. (discussing the current trend of claims adjusters allowing
policyholders to “self-assess” their property during a claim, providing no feedback,
and then not informing them when they have missed a potential award).
204. See generally supra Part IV (exploring the potential risks to policyholders
through unregulated collection, use, and transfer of data via drones during risk
assessment and claims adjustment).
205. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text (espousing several
pro-drone arguments that laud the diversity of a typical commercial drone’s
payload, their maneuverability, and the versatility of on-board cameras and
mapping lasers).
206. See generally supra Part III (offering a primer on the technological
capabilities of insurance drones and their roles operations in risk assessment and
claims adjustment).
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process must be hemmed within a desire to prevent these
capabilities from aiding unfair discrimination.
One way to achieve this would be to institute time-based
restrictions on how long insurers can access drone-gathered data
or keep it on file. 207 Gregory McNeal’s proposal for the use of drones
in government and police operations applies this suggestion in a
parallel context. 208 Making drone-gathered information more
difficult to access as time passes prevents discriminatory redlining
based on historical trends or outdated information. 209 If these
restrictions are codified, there will be little room for individual
modification by insurers. 210 This ensures consistency and
predictability in enforcement and would provide reviewing entities
with applicable standards of conduct for data access in unfair
discrimination claims. 211 Regulations on data retention also
decrease the likelihood of information on an insured and their
property being improperly shared with third parties without their
consent. 212 Additional regulations might focus on the methods of
collection, processing, and storage of the data, such as software,
operator access, flight patterns, and data transmission. 213 Courts
207. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 18 (discussing the public’s concern over
potentially unlimited access to data gathered by drones that is placed in long-term
storage, particularly within the context of government or police operations, and
recommending time-based restrictions on that access).
208. See id. (“To protect against pervasive surveillance and warehousing of
data about citizens, legislators should enact retention policies and procedures
that make it more difficult for the government to access information as time
passes.”).
209. See id. at 18–19 (proposing various time-based restrictions on data access
that would prevent the police or government from using intimate details or
irrelevant historical data to draw conclusions in surveillance and analysis).
210. See id. at 18 (“While the specific duration of time and processes may be
subject to debate, all procedures and timelines should be legislatively determined
and therefore cannot be modified by individual agencies.”).
211. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
consistency among state jurisdictions in standards of review for unfair
discrimination claims).
212. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 18–19 (explaining how restrictions on the
retention of data from drone operations, as well as automatic deletion procedures
and protection from certain information release mandates, will necessarily keep
private and sensitive information from falling into the hands of a party without
consent of the individual).
213. See id. at 18 (“Legislators should adopt policies that address collection
and retention of information in a way that focuses on the information that is
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and legislators could then decide whether these considerations
were adhered to in a particular discrimination claim and evaluate
fairness using concrete policy, as opposed to vague statutory
language. 214
c. Regulatory Devices Promoting Transparent Accountability
By far, the most difficult piece of this puzzle is regulating the
application of drone-collected data to insurers’ underwriting
formulas in order to prevent unfairly discriminatory redlining 215
and disparate impact. 216 While insurers often set their own
assessment formulas within general parameters of the relevant
state regulations, 217 a competent regulatory scheme must hold
them accountable to policyholders. It is tempting to propose a
blanket exclusion of certain types of data or usage, such as images
and videos of the relevant property. 218 While this would be
reassuring to policyholders, a balanced framework must allow
insurers to retain some autonomy. 219 Therefore, a better
suggestion may be to require transparency and accountability
collected, how it is stored, and how it is accessed, rather than the particular
technology used to collect the information.”).
214. See supra Part II (considering multiple examples of courts relying on
vague or inadequate statutory language in evaluating the fairness of a particular
practice, often resulting in very different interpretations).
215. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (defining redlining as a
situation where “the insurer charges higher rates or declines to write insurance
for people who live in particular areas”); supra notes 130–133 and accompanying
text (discussing modern examples of redlining and treatment of the practice by
different jurisdictions).
216. See supra notes 45–49 (outlining the development and current
applications of the Disparate Impact Rule).
217. See GARY M. COHEN, NEW APPLEMAN ON INS. LAW LIB. ED. § 8.02(1)(a)
(2013) (stating that each state in the United States and Washington, D.C., are
tasked with “regulating the business of insurance,” and describing various state
regulatory structures addressing the insurance industry).
218. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 27–29 (stating that legislators “should be
careful to not craft hasty legislation based on emotionally charged rhetoric,” and
projecting the negative ramifications of overly broad, sweeping regulations on
commercial drone use in an aerial surveillance context of any kind).
219. See id. at 28 (recommending that legislators enact regulations that
balance legitimate aerial surveillance and drone uses within an industry against
interests of the private individual subject to that surveillance).
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measures on the part of insurers, such as regular publication
regarding their usage of commercial drones and the data they
gather. 220 McNeal suggests a similar requirement when discussing
the use of drones in police operations, focusing on the publication
of “usage logs.” 221 In the insurance context, policyholders
concerned over the extent of drone operations in their risk
assessment or the evaluation of a claim could simply examine
those publications. 222
Alternatively, insurers could prepare logs and give them only
to the policyholder in cases where sensitive or personal
information is involved. 223 As McNeal suggests, it might even be
possible for insurers to outfit their drones with software that
records these logs automatically, and allows their export to
authorized parties. 224 This retains privacy for the individual and
the agency, but still creates a record that reviewing courts could
look to if an unfairly discriminatory result arose. 225 Accountability
and transparency regulations might also counteract the potential
for disparate impact discrimination; failures to heed policy could
prove the causation element required for a successful claim. 226
220. See id. at 19 (“To hold law enforcement accountable, legislators should
mandate that the use of all aerial surveillance devices (manned or unmanned) be
published on a regular basis (perhaps quarterly) on the website of the agency
operating the system.”).
221. See id. (“These usage logs should detail who operated the system, when
it was operated, where it was operated (including GPS coordinates), and what the
law enforcement purpose for the operation was.”).
222. See id. at 21 (“Just as a police helicopter high overhead can be ominous
to those on the ground who are unaware of its purposes, the very idea of drones—
of any kind—flying above American cities and towns might be foreboding to many
lay persons.”).
223. See id. at 20 (discussing alternative publishing strategies where
sensitive or personal information is involved in the log).
224. See id. at 19–20 (“Legislators may even mandate that unmanned systems
operated in their jurisdictions come equipped with software that allows for the
easy export of flight logs that contain this information.”).
225. McNeal discusses this benefit in an analogous context of United Kingdom
police departments who publish their usage logs from helicopter and drone
operations. See id. at 20 (describing police efforts in Islington and other British
cities to publish helicopter usage logs to the public through Twitter and social
media platforms, which has resulted in increased accountability, decreased public
complaints, and more transparent operational standards).
226. To prove causation, policyholders would argue that the use,
manipulation, or transfer of data through drone operations proximately caused a
discriminatory result in ratings, assessment, or claims adjustment. See Dana L.
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Where insurers may have used technology such as satellite
imagery to quietly redline vast portions of land, 227 drone
operations would be transparent. Their results would be open to
examination, and insurers would be forced to prove that their
considerations were within the bounds of reason and fairness. 228
The threat of accountability may prevent insurers from
discriminating against regions based on geographic, economic, or
even racial indicators drawn from drone-collected data. 229
As far as risk assessment and claims adjustment procedures
are concerned, some level of trust between insurers and
policyholders remains necessary. 230 However, drawing back the
veil on the use of drones in these processes ensures some level of
accountability by insurers to policyholders in their operation of
drones. Time-based restrictions, regulations on data retention and
collection, and transparent accountability will serve as a solid
foundation upon which to build that trust. 231
Kaersvang, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowner’s
Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 2014 (2006) (examining the necessary steps to
prove the causation element of a disparate impact claim, and various factors
insurers consider such as crime rate, claims paid out, territorial boundaries, and
the quality of municipal services).
227. See supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text (detailing a
California-based insurer’s use of satellite imagery to deny coverage to an entire
zone of previously insured properties based on newly discovered proximity to
flammable wild brush).
228. Recall that claims adjusters must conduct “reasonable” investigations to
avoid sanctions for bad-faith practices. See supra notes 119–120 and
accompanying text (describing the insurer’s duty to conduct a “reasonable
investigation” before denying a claim and potential consequences of the failure to
do so).
229. Again, this notion returns to the idea of transparency and accountability
regulations creating a record for courts to refer to where a policyholder claims
drone operations are the cause of disparate impact or other class-based
discrimination through insurance practices. See generally Kaersvang, supra note
226 (discussing the elements of a successful disparate impact claim, the procedure
for proving it to a reviewing entity, and factors that insurers are more or less
likely to consider based on vulnerability to a disparate impact claim and
accountability for that effect).
230. See Kai-Uwe Schanz, Reputation and Reputational Risk Management,
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN 377, 377–78 (2006), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/
41952888.pdf (“Clearly, for financial services in general, and for insurers in
particular, the trust of policyholders and other stakeholders is a necessary
condition for conducting business.”).
231. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 28 (recommending that legislators pursue
enhanced transparency measures and data protection procedures to balance the
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C. Entities Capable of Effectuating Regulatory Countermeasures
With this framework in mind, the final task is to examine
which entities, if any, may be appropriate to introduce these
countermeasures, and how they might do so. Historically, the
insurance industry has enjoyed a rare exclusion from federal
regulatory efforts, instead relying overwhelmingly on state law to
regulate their conduct and policies. 232 This has led to grave
inconsistencies in standards of review and enforcement, as well
frustration from federal and industry officials. 233
1. States as Insurance Regulators
For over 100 years, the Supreme Court has recognized the
power of states to exercise “superintendence and control over the
business of insurance” through statutory exercise of their
regulatory and police powers. 234 Through state departments and
insurance commissioners, states are generally responsible for
licensing insurers, examining their books and records, and
investigating claims of unfair practices. 235 States also have the
interests of private individuals against the goals of insurers).
232. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.02(1)(a) (“Every state, and the District of
Columbia, has an office in the executive branch that is charged with regulating
the business of insurance. In some states, this office is a stand-alone Department
of Insurance, while in others it is part of an agency with broader regulatory
authority.”) (footnotes omitted).
233. See Gary M. Cohen, Framework for the Regulation of the Insurance
Industry—New Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition, Chapter 8, NEW
APPLEMAN BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010, 1:42 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legal
newsroom/insurance/b/applemaninsurance/archive/2010/04/19/framework-forthe-regulation-of-the-insurance-industry.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) (“Many
in the industry, as well as the Treasury Department in its recent White Paper on
regulatory reform, have criticized state regulation as inconsistent and outmoded,
claiming that its lack of uniformity imposes an undue regulatory burden on
market participants.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
234. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 412, 414–15 (1914)
(evaluating the legitimacy of state involvement in fire insurance ratings,
discussing the historical trend of state involvement in “the business of insurance”
dating back at least to 1837 in Massachusetts, and recognizing that it falls within
the scope of the regulatory and police powers of the state).
235. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.02(2)(c) (outlining the standard
administrative framework of state insurance departments, the role and powers of
the insurance commissioner, licensing requirements, and investigation
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authority to regulate rates to an extent, and may consider the
“Model Laws” of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) for guidance, or adopt them. 236 Although
state rating policies vary widely, their ultimate purpose remains
as a lone bastion of consistency: “to ensure that rates not be
excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.” 237 Beyond this,
however, states are divided in their approaches to rating
regulation; most employ either a “prior approval” 238 or a “file and
use” 239 approach. The “flex rating” approach represents a hybrid of
these two systems, and is used in a few jurisdictions. 240
Consequently, state departments and insurance commissioners
have the power to promulgate regulations that implement
insurance statutes enacted by the relevant legislature. 241 All this
is to say that regulation in the insurance industry has historically
run through the states. This characteristic has led to inconsistency
and frustration, and the regulatory solution this Note proposes
latches on to this growing unrest, championing greater federal
involvement and more cohesion between regimes. 242
procedures).
236. See id. § 8.02(2)(g) (“State insurance commissioners also have
well-established authority to regulate insurance rates. Nearly every state has
some form of rate regulation, but the particulars vary state-by-state and by the
line of insurance. NAIC model laws reflect this diversity.”).
237. Id.
238. See id. (“Under the ‘prior approval’ approach, insurers file proposed rates
with the state’s insurance department and must wait a specified period of time
before the rates become effective. During this period, the state may request
revisions to the rates, support for the rates or may even disapprove the rates.”).
239. See id. (“Some states use a ‘file and use’ approach, which permits the
insurer to use the filed rate unless, and until, the insurance department takes
steps to disapprove the rate within a specified time.”).
240. See id. (“The ‘flex rating’ approach is a hybrid of the ‘prior approval’ and
‘file and use’ approaches. This permits insurers to file and then use their rates,
provided their rates are within a specified range.”).
241. See id. § 8.02(3) (“Insurance departments have the authority to
promulgate regulations implementing insurance statutes enacted by the
legislature. The department’s rulemaking authority is generally subject to
procedural limitations, including a requirement to provide notice to interested
parties and the public and an opportunity to submit comments on the proposed
regulations.”) (footnote omitted).
242. See id. § 8.07(9)(a) (“Frustration with the costs, delays, and inconsistent
regulation that is believed to be inherent in state-based regulation led to calls for
Congressional legislation that would establish a regime of federal regulation
which would preempt state laws and regulations governing the business of
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2. Potential Federal Regulators

“There has been increasing involvement by the federal
government in the insurance industry, sometimes with the support
of all or portions of the industry and sometimes despite its
opposition.” 243 After the financial collapse of 2008, the proposal of
several bills culminated in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (the Act). 244 Among other reforms,
the Act created the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) to study “the
current state-based system of insurance regulation and the costs
and benefits of the potential federal regulation of insurance.” 245
The FIO has the authority to monitor “all aspects of the insurance
industry” and “the extent to which traditionally underserved
communities
and consumers, minorities and low-and
moderate-income persons have access to affordable insurance
products regarding all lines of insurance, except health
insurance.” 246 After releasing a study on how to modernize and
improve the system of insurance regulation in the United States
(albeit well past its initial deadline), 247 the FIO has since taken on
the role of an active market observer. The scope of its influence,
however, clearly encompasses the integration of commercial
drones into risk assessment and claims adjustment. 248
The NAIC is another entity that is heavily involved with
insurance regulation at the federal level. 249 Its stated mission is to
insurance.”).
243. Id. § 8.07(1).
244. 111 P.L. 203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
245. COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.702(1).
246. Id. § 8.702(10). This authority is limited in a few excepted categories,
including health insurance and crop insurance, which are regulated by other
entities. See id. (“The authority of the Office extends to all insurance lines except
health insurance, long-term care insurance, with specified exceptions, and crop
insurance.”); see also 31 U.S.C. § 313(d)(1)–(3) (defining the scope of the FIO’s
regulatory power and specifically listing health and crop insurance as exceptions).
247. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.07(10)(c) (discussing the goals,
consideration factors, deadlines, and subsequent impacts of the three FIO reports,
including the report on modernization and improvement).
248. See supra note 246 (discussing the scope of the FIO’s authority under
31 U.S.C. § 313(d) and its limited exceptions).
249. See Cohen, supra note 233 (commenting on the NAIC’s role in insurance
regulation and their recent push for uniformity between federal and state
regulatory regimes).
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“assist state insurance regulators, individually and collectively, in
serving the public interest and achieving the following
fundamental insurance regulatory goals in a responsive, efficient
and cost effective manner, consistent with the wishes of its
members.” 250 The NAIC is organized into six standing committees
that address various areas of the insurance industry. 251 The
primary method of influence for these committees is to create and
approve “Model Laws” and “Model Regulations” addressing
various topics within the industry. 252 These are non-binding unless
a state specifically adopts them, but are promulgated to promote
uniformity and influence policy. 253 “The use of model acts and
regulations to promote uniformity has led to decidedly mixed
results; there are some model laws which have been adopted by all
of the states, while others have been adopted by relatively few.” 254
3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Suggested Regulators
Fostering the cooperation and consistency between federal
and state regulators is the key to effective implementation of any
drone-centric regulatory framework. 255 An obvious suggestion is to
task the NAIC with promulgating Model Regulations that address
the use of drones in risk assessment and claims adjustment in
particular. 256 Clear, consistent Model Regulations requiring
minimum
site
visitation,
responsible
data
practices,
accountability, and transparency could provide much desired
250. COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.05(2).
251. See id. §8.05(4) (describing each of the six standing committees of the
NAIC, including the subjects of insurance that each committee covers).
252. See id. § 8.05(5) (“The primary way that the NAIC promotes uniformity
and influences policy is through the creation and approval of its Model Acts and
Model Regulations.”).
253. See id. (“These laws have no effect unless adopted by the legislatures of
the respective states.”).
254. Id.
255. See McNeal, supra note 155, at 5 (exploring the background of the FAA
and other federal agencies’ involvement in the integration of commercial drones
into the national airspace, and discussing the need to create recommendations
that synthesize state and local regulatory efforts with federal actions).
256. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.05(5) (“The primary way that the NAIC
promotes uniformity and influences policy is through the creation and approval
of its Model Acts and Model Regulations.”).
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consistency and predictability for reviewers of drone-influenced
insurance practices. 257 The main issue with this approach is that,
like other model codes, the NAIC’s Model Laws are not binding on
states unless they expressly adopt them. 258 Therefore, while Model
Regulations on insurance drones could provide consistent,
persuasive authority for reviewing entities in cases of unfair
discrimination, a lack of state participation may doom this option
to relative ineffectiveness. 259
Alternatively, the FIO could prove useful in propelling a
regulatory framework forward at the federal level. 260 One way to
involve them would be to propose an “optional charter” system. 261
First proposed by Congress in 2002 concerning life and property
insurance underwriting, this method would create an “opt-in”
regulatory system for insurers at the federal level. 262 The Charter
would grant general regulatory authority to the FIO or another
federal agency and impose minimum standards on the states,
which would retain the responsibility of regulating ratings. 263 This
homogenous federal regime could foster consistency across
jurisdictions by creating a baseline of standards from which to
257. See supra notes 190–254 and accompanying text (exploring minimum
visitation requirements, data retention and time-based restrictions on access, and
transparency and accountability measures, and connecting them as solutions to
help courts evaluate potentially unfair discrimination in insurance practices).
258. See supra note 253 (discussing the non-binding character of NAIC Model
Laws and Regulations).
259. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.05(5)(a) (explaining that efforts by the
NAIC to encourage uniformity in matters related to consumer protection and
other restrictive rating laws are often polarizing, and thus not attractive to most
states).
260. See id. § 8.07(1) (describing the genesis of the FIO through the
promulgation of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010).
261. See id. § 8.07(9)(b) (“[An optional federal charter] would permit national
insurance companies to choose whether to be regulated by the federal government
or by the states, much as banks can, under some circumstances, choose whether
to be state-regulated thrifts or federally chartered savings and loans.”).
262. See id. (“[The Charter] would have created an Office of National Insurers,
a new federal agency under the Treasury Department, and established an
optional federal charter for national insurers to underwrite both life and
property/casualty insurance.”).
263. See id. (“The federal regulator would have had general regulatory
authority over solvency and policy forms, but rate regulation would have been left
to the states. The states would still have licensed producers, subject to minimum
federal standards.”).
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draw during evaluations of discriminatory insurance practices
resulting from drone-based operations. 264 If legislators could
gather enough support, they could even replace the “optional”
nature of the charter with codified mandatory minimums that
would apply to all states. 265 It is possible that the “opt-in”
characteristic could relegate the FIO to a similar “persuasive”
position as discussed in the NAIC example. 266 At a minimum,
however, either option creates a persuasive regulatory platform
addressing the risks of unfairly discriminatory insurance practices
resulting from insurers’ use of drones. 267 This still accomplishes
the goal of providing states with intelligible guidance, and
promotes uniformity among the jurisdictions.
It is unlikely that states will ever be completely stripped of the
responsibility to regulate ratings and combat unfair
discrimination. 268 Instead, progress is more likely to be found in
sponsoring a cohesive regulatory approach between the federal and
state levels. 269 A system of federal minimums addressing specific
concerns like interpersonal contact, data security, transparency,
and accountability could achieve this and counteract the
264. See id. (explaining that the role of the optional charter was to provide
state regulatory bodies with common policy considerations when generating their
own rating regulations).
265. This would probably take more convincing, as Congress has failed thus
far to pass even the original optional structure, due to state tensions over
perceived pressure on states to comply. See ETTI BARANOFF ET AL., 1 ENTERPRISE
AND INDIVIDUAL RISK MANAGEMENT 326 (2012) (discussing the evolution of
legislation that “added fuel to the debate of state versus federal insurance
regulation” and why the optional federal charter and certain other provisions did
not make the final versions of various laws).
266. See supra notes 258–259 and accompanying text (delineating the
inherent problem of an NAIC-based regulatory solution stemming from the fact
that NAIC Model Regulations are not binding on states unless those states
expressly adopt them).
267. See generally supra Part II (discussing the current inconsistency and
lack of coherent authority for courts to follow in unfair discrimination
evaluations, and the need for better sources of guidance).
268. See BARANOFF, supra note 265, at 332 (“The state insurance
commissioners have extensive power in approving policy forms and controlling
the rates for insurance.”).
269. See id. at 326–27 (discussing the ongoing debate between federal and
state regulation of insurance, the relatively small size of state regulatory offices,
inadequacies in administration that can result from those deficiencies, and
arguments that increased federal involvement would alleviate this).

1598

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1549 (2016)

discriminatory potential of drone operations. 270 Whether in the
form of NAIC Model Regulations or an FIO Charter 271—whether
optional, persuasive, binding, or instructive—a framework that
addresses these concerns at the federal level will positively
influence state policies. The resulting structure will be more
consistent, predictable, and reliable for everyone involved:
insurers, policyholders, and reviewing courts and agencies. 272
In summation, the current regulatory landscape of the
insurance industry is inadequate to address the risks of unfairly
discriminatory insurance practices advanced by commercial drone
integration. 273 The best method for implementing an adequate
solution is to increase involvement at the federal level to promote
synergy among the states. 274 Specifically, such a framework should
require minimum visitation by human agents during risk
assessment and claims adjustment. 275 In addition, it should
270. See generally supra notes 190–255 and accompanying text (offering these
countermeasures as a proposed regulatory framework to combat a potential rise
in unfairly discriminatory practice as a result of commercial drone operations by
insurers).
271. See supra notes 252–254 and accompanying text (describing the NAIC’s
role in insurance regulation and their process of issuing Model Regulations to
encourage uniformity among jurisdictions); supra notes 261–264 (hypothesizing
the construction of an “optional charter” regime under the FIO, and its benefits
as persuasive, or perhaps binding, authority).
272. Compare this conclusion to the one McNeal draws from his regulatory
proposal to legislators addressing government and police drone use. See McNeal,
supra note 155, at 28 (concluding that a regulatory approach that focuses on
cooperation between federal and state jurisdictions, limits “pervasive
surveillance” through restrictions on access to and retention of data, and
encourages transparency and accountability by the operator, is the best approach
to the integration of drones).
273. See Maj. Stephen Maddox & Capt. David Stuckenberg, Drones in the U.S.
National Airspace System: A Safety and Security Assessment, HARV. L. SCH. NAT’L
SECURITY J. (Feb. 24, 2015, 10:53 AM), http://harvardnsj.org/2015/02/drones-inthe-u-s-national-airspace-system-a-safety-and-security-assessment/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2016) (“Presently, drone integration is problematic due to regulatory
impediments on their operations and the resultant political climate.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
274. See COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.07(10)(c) (discussing the mission of the
FIO and the Dodd-Frank Act, both of which place an emphasis on an increased
federal role in insurance regulation as a response to growing unrest with the lack
of uniformity in regulation and enforcement between states).
275. See supra notes 200–203 (proposing minimum human visitation
requirements for claims adjustment, and exploring the potential implementation
strategies and benefits of them as a countermeasure to discriminatory practices
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address the collection, use, storage, and transmission of data,
perhaps through time-based and retention restrictions. 276 Finally,
that framework must hold insurers accountable for their drone
usage by mandating transparency, possibly through required
publications and disclosures of their operations. 277 This solution
could be implemented in multiple ways, including NAIC Model
Regulations 278 or an optional charter underneath the FIO. 279 At
minimum, either of these options will produce persuasive
authority for reviewing courts and policymakers concerned with
the nexus between insurance drone integration and unfairly
discriminatory practices. 280
VI. Conclusion
The integration of drones into risk assessment and claims
adjustment operations presents a formidable challenge to
individuals who seek to prevent insurers from using drones to
discriminate unfairly. The addition of commercial drones to the
toolset of insurance underwriters is akin to introducing the first
automobile into a small town with horse drawn carriages. What do
you do with it? What are the rules? It is easy to propose that initial
drone operations and products need to “fit in” the existing
arising from the use of drones by insurers).
276. See supra notes 204–213 (discussing the benefits of potential regulations
addressing time, retention, and transfer of data gathered by drones during risk
assessment and claims adjustment proceedings).
277. See supra notes 214–229 (outlining several arguments in favor of
imposing transparency and accountability related regulations on insurers and
comparing that proposal to one made in the context of government and police uses
of drones for aerial surveillance).
278. See generally COHEN, supra note 217 § 8.05 (describing the organization,
mission, and activities of the NAIC, including their promulgation of Model Laws
and Regulations for the purpose of promoting uniformity among state
jurisdictions in insurance regulation).
279. See id. § 8.07(10) (laying out the creation of the FIO through the
Dodd-Frank Act, its mission, and optional charter provisions that were proposed
with its original legislation); BARANOFF, supra note 265, at 326 (describing the
optional federal charter proposal for insurance regulation, and weighing its
attractiveness in the overall debate between federal and state regulation).
280. See generally supra Part V (discussing repeatedly the operation of the
NAIC and FIO, the potential persuasive and binding authority that they may
promulgate, and their role in the framework proposed by this Note).
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framework of established regulations in the industry. The
problem—as this Note has explained—is that efforts to establish
this foundation are moving at a dangerously slow pace. In fact,
entrusting the government at any level to efficiently create a set of
rules to operate within may be downright Pollyannaish.
Regardless, a very real threat exists of growth in discriminatory
practices within the insurance industry, as the powerful
capabilities of drone systems continue to reveal themselves.
It is necessary, therefore to address this inevitable industrial
revolution with a responsible, cohesive, and organized approach.
With an understanding of the current landscape of insurance
regulation and commercial drone integration, it is possible to
identify the risks these drones pose to policyholders. Chief among
these is the concern that unregulated drone use in risk assessment
and claims adjustment will lead to a rise in unfairly discriminatory
insurance practices. A regulatory framework that fosters
coordination between federal and state governments can combat
these risks. This cooperative effort will provide consistency and
reliable authority for reviewing courts and policymakers to lean on
when evaluating claims of unfair discrimination.
Hearken back to our friend Ethel Baxter. If nobody is willing
to identify these potential abuses and propose a workable solution,
to whom will she turn? As a society, are we prepared to let Ethel
and others be shut out from the risk assessment and claims
processes completely? Have we decided that digital imaging,
laser-mapping,
inflexible
algorithms,
and
robotic
recommendations should replace a real human being? Will we
allow entire communities to be exposed to unchecked
informational sorties by fleets of pre-programmed insurance
agents? These questions leave us on the brink, a regulatory tipping
point between the balances of efficiency and fairness. We stare now
into the maw of a great wave that will take us in one of two
directions: forward, to a society where even machines treat
policyholders fairly, or somewhere darker, where the true goals of
the process remain uncertain.

